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Mead: Admiralty Law

ADMIRALTY LAW

ARE SEAMEN STILL THE "WARDS OF
ADMIRALTY"? SUTTON v. EARLES: NINTH
CIRCUIT EXTENDS LOSS OF SOCIETY
DAMAGES TO NON-DEPENDENT PARENTS
OF NON-SEAMEN IN MARITIME WRONGFUL
DEATH ACTION
"Have you news of my boy Jack?"
Not this tide.
"When d'you think that he'll come back?"
Not with this wind blowing, and this tide.
"Has anyone else had word of him?"
Not this tide.
For what is sunk will hardly swim,
Not with this wind blowing, and this tide.
"Oh, dear, what comfort can I find?"
None this tide,
Nor any tide,
Except he did not shame his kind Not even with the wind blowing, and that
tide.
Then hold your head up all the more,
This tide,
And every tide;
Because he was the son you bore,
And gave to that wind blowing and that
tide.!
.1. RUDYARD KIPLING, My Boy Jack, in RUDYARD KIPLING'S VERSE, 216
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INTRODUCTION

In Sutton v. Earles 2 ("Earles Ir), the Ninth Circuit addressed an issue of first impression, namely whether in a
wrongful death action, under general maritime law,3 loss of
society damages' could be awarded to the parents of non-sea-

<Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1940) (1914-18). Kipling's poem, portraying the
anguish of the mother of a seaman lost at sea, captures the essence of the loss of
society issue as it relates to the American merchant seaman's struggle for a standard of living on par with the rest of American society. For a concise yet comprehensive historical background of the struggle for seamen's rights, see chapter one
of Mariam Sherar's sociological study of the American merchant seaman. See
MARIAM G. SHERAR, SHIPPING OUT 1-6 (Cornell Maritime Press, Inc. 1973). It is
the author's hope that readers keep this poem in mind, as well as the struggle for
parity it symbolizes, when considering this review of recent admiralty law cases.
2. Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1994) (per Canby, J.; the other
panel members were Tang, J., and Beezer, J.), remand before appeal, Earles v.
United States, 935 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1991) (per Leavy, J, with whom Browning,
J., joined; Pregerson, J., dissenting). This case is hereinafter referred to as "Earles
II" because it was decided on remand from a prior Ninth Circuit decision, Earles
v. United States, which the court refers to in Sutton v. Earles as "Earles I." See
Earles II, 26 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 1994).
3. The general maritime law of the United States is federal court-made law
that, absent preemptive legislation, applies to cases brought in pure admiralty
jurisdiction (federal court only), as well as other maritime cases (brought either in
state or federal court, but relying on maritime principles). U.S. CONST. art. III, §
2, cl. 1 (extending the judicial power of the United States to all cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction). See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988) (codifying the federal
courts' authority to develop a substantive body of general maritime law); Southern
Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 254 (1917) (holding that state law that changes,
modifies, or affects the interstate uniformity of the general maritime law is unconstitutional). See also THoMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAw § 41, at 121 n.3 (1987 & Supp. 1992).
4. Loss of society damages are those damages in a wrongful death action
which compensate the decedent's beneficiary for deprivation of the decedent's continued existence, including: love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort,
and protection. Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585 (1974). See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 127, at 949-54
(5th ed. 1984) (noting developments, trends, and issues concerning awards for loss
of society in the common law of torts). Loss of society damages are non-pecuniary,
but recovery for the dependent's mental anguish or grief is prohibited. Gaudet, 414
U.S. at 585 n.17. In theory, loss of society damages under general maritime law
compensate for losses that would be awarded in a land based tort law action under loss of consortium, and include amounts for deprivation of the decedent's existence generally. See id. at 585. Therefore, a claim for loss of society is substantially the same as one for loss of consortium. Nichols v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.,
17 F.3d 119, 122 n.4 (5th Cir. 1994). For clarity, this comment will use the term
embraced by admiralty courts, loss of society.
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men5 killed in territorial waters6 regardless of whether the

5. Seamen have special status in admiralty and maritime law: a seaman is
one who is employed on a vessel and whose duties contribute to the accomplishment of the vessel's mission. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355
(1991). The decedents in Earles II were passengers in a pleasure craft, and thus
were not seamen. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915.
Seaman status is primarily a statutory privilege which, among other things,
allows the claimant to take advantage of certain substantive aspects of maritime
law which differ from traditional tort law. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988) (section
688 is referred to as "the Jones Act"). First, under the Jones Act, the defendantemployer owes a seaman a higher duty of care, the so called "featherweight standard" of liability, the standard for breach is "the slightest negligence." Simeon v.
T. Smith & Son, Inc., 852 F.2d 1421, 1430 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1106 (1989). Second, under the Jones Act a seaman may recover under a more
lenient standard of proximate cause which merely requires that the defendantemployer's negligence contributed "in the slightest degree" to the injury or death.
Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 523 (1957).
A seaman also has a right to recover under the general maritime law for
any unseaworthiness of the vessel which caused his accident. Mitchell v. Trawler
Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549 (1960). This action does not require proof of negligence by the seaman's employer, rather it requires proof that the vessel or appurtenance was not reasonably fit for its intended purpose and there was a causal
connection between this and the seaman's injury or death. [d. at 550. Under the
unseaworthiness theory, recovery is akin to strict liability and the lenient Jones
Act standard of proof does not apply. [d. at 549. Such examples of preferential
treatment toward seamen are common in admiralty jurisdiction and are justified
by the policy of "special solicitude." See Harden v. Gordon, 11 F.Cas. 480, 483
(C.C.D. Me. 1823). See generally SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, § 5-1 at 158 (noting
that seamen have access to special remedies not awarded others under the law of
admiralty).
In the words of Justice Joseph' Story, the rationale for providing seamen
special solicitude, admiralty law's greatest protection, is:
[to effectuate the] public policy of preserving [seamen] for
the commercial service and maritime defence of the nation. Every act of legislation which secures their
healths, ... is as wise in policy, as it is just in obligation. Even the merchant himself derives an ultimate benefit from what may seem at first an onerous charge. It
encourages seamen to engage in perilous voyages with
more promptitude. . . .
Harden, 11 F.Cas. at 483 (noting that elements of the principle of "special solicitude" to seamen are present in the laws of most principal maritime nations and
can, in Anglo-American jurisprudence, be traced back to the medieval sea code, the
Rolls of Oleron). See also Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 577; Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 386-88 (1970).
6. Territorial waters are that portion of the sea that extends out three nautical miles (one maritime league) from the coast line of a state, and over which
that state exercises sovereignty. See RENE DE KERCHOVE, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME DICTIONARY 828 (D. Van Norstrand Co., 2d ed. 1961). In contrast, the high
seas are that continuous body of navigable salt water that lies outside territorial
waters and the maritime lines of demarcation of various nations. [d. at 371-72. It
should be noted that for purposes of international law of the sea, the "territorial
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parents were financial dependents of the decedents. 7 The court
held that the non-dependent parents of decedents killed in an
allision8 between a pleasure craft and a Navy mooring buoy
could recover for loss of society.9 The court reasoned that the
financial dependency requirement, used by the Second, Fifth
and Sixth Circuits lO when deciding whether to award loss of
society in maritime wrongful death actions, was inconsistent
with the humanitarian policy of providing extended remedies
to those who bring suit in admiralty jurisdiction. l l The Ninth
Circuit's reasoning de-emphasizes the importance of fashioning
uniform recovery between maritime wrongful death actions
that are brought solely under general maritime law and those
brought under the federal maritime statutory scheme. 12

sea" of the United States has been extended to twelve nautical miles. Proclama·
tion No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (1988). This definition of the territorial sea, how·
ever, is distinct from territorial waters for maritime wrongful death purposes, and
does not affect admiralty jurisdiction generally. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, §
2·1 at 20; 1 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 141, at 9·3 (7th ed. 1988).
7. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 920.
8. An allision is, in maritime terminology, the striking of a moving vessel
against a stationary object. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990).
9. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914·17.
10. Id. at 916·17, 916 n.14. See Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries,
Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1090·93 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1060 (1994);
Anderson v. Whittaker Corp., 894 F.2d 804, 811·12 (6th Cir. 1990) (both holding
that the non·dependent parents of non·seamen killed in territorial waters could not
recover loss of society damages under general maritime law); Miles v. Melrose, 882
F.2d 976, 989 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the non·dependent parent of a seaman
killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages under general
maritime law), affd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990). See
also Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., No. 93·7490, 1994 WL 685690, at
*3·4 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1994); Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on December 21,
1988, 37 F.3d 804, 828·30 (2d Cir. 1994) (both holding that federal maritime law
does not allow recovery for loss of society to non.dependent family members). Cf.
Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 531·38 (E.D. La. 1994) (holding by direction of
the Fifth Circuit that the family members of a non·seaman killed in territorial
waters could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime law),
remand before decision, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993).
11. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916·17.
12. Id. at 917. Maritime wrongful death law is governed by three separate
causes of action, two statutory, and one court·made: (1) the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
app. § 688 (1988); (2) the Death on the High Seas Act, "DOHSA," 46 U.S.C. app.
§§ 761·68 (1988); and (3) a "Moragne action," Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398
U.S. 375 (1970) (creating a court·made wrongful death action in the general mario
time law). See generally SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, § 7·1 at 235·36 (noting that a
"crazy quilt pattern" of wrongful death actions is recognized in admiralty jurisdic·
tion).
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The Ninth Circuit's holding extends loss of society damages under general maritime law to the non-financially dependent parents of non-seamen who perish within territorial waters, despite a recent United States Supreme Court decision 13
which affirmed the importance of uniformity14 by declining to
award loss of society damages to the non-dependent mother of
a seaman killed in territorial waters.15
This comment compares the Ninth Circuit's holding with
the approaches other courts have taken regarding loss of society damages and the dependency rule for awarding such recovery in maritime wrongful death actions. This comment corteludes that, although the Ninth Circuit's decision was an empathetic attempt at developing the law of maritime damages,
the holding's glaring conflict with the spirit of the maritime
remedial statutory scheme is exemplary of a growing problem
in maritime law. Specifically, as judges struggle to keep the
rules of admiralty current with common law developments
outside the maritime context, the separation of judge-made
doctrine from Congressional policy widens within admiralty
jurisdiction, thereby creating new and greater anomalies in
admiralty uniformity, more uncertainty for admiralty practitioners, and unfair results for some maritime tort victims. 16
13. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 30-33 (1990) (holding that the
parent of a seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society
damages).
14. The seminal decision explaining the need for uniformity in general maritime law stressed that application of this principal rises to the level of a Constitutional mandate. See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874). In The
Lottawanna, the Supreme Court announced:
One thing, however is unquestionable: The Constitution
must have referred to a system of law co-extensive with
and operating uniformly in the whole country. It certainly
could not have been the intent to place the Rules and
limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation
of the several States, as that would have defeated the
uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution
aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting
the intercourse of the States with each other or with
foreign States.
The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 575. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
15. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917; see Miles, 498 U.S. at 30-33.
16. See Lizabeth L. Burrell, Current Problems in Maritime Uniformity, 5 U.S.F.
MAR L.J. 67, 82 (1992) (noting that when mainstream developments are incorporated into maritime law creating persistent conflicts in uniformity and clashes
with settled admiralty tenets, the Supreme Court must lead the way).
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 28, 1984, at approximately 3:00 a.m., a twenty-foot long jet powered ski boat, the WHISKEY RUNNER, entered a channel designated for recreational boats inside the
United States Naval Weapons Station at Seal Beach, Huntington Harbor, California. 17 Nine people were aboard the WHISKEY RUNNER when it entered the channel traveling between
40 and 45 miles per hour.18 Seconds later, the boat headed
outside the marked channel and struck "Oscar 8,"19 an unilluminated Navy mooring buoy.20 The WHISKEY RUNNER sank
immediately.21 Five of the passengers died on impact; the remaining four occupants sustained personal injuries. 22 One of
the survivors was Virl Earles, the operator of the WHISKEY
RUNNER.23 A blood alcohol test administered to Virl Earles
several hours after the incident revealed a blood alcohol level
of .11%.24

17. Earles v. United States ("Earles I"), 935 F.2d 1028, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 1991)
(per Leavy, J, with whom Browning, J., joined; Pregerson, J., dissenting), appeal
after remand, Sutton v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1994) (per
Canby, J.; the other panel members were Tang, J., and Beezer, J.).
18. Earles I, 935 F.2d at 1030. The local speed limit was between 3 and 8
knots. Id. A knot is the unit of speed used in navigation which is the rate of one
nautical mile per hour. 1 NATHANIEL BOWDITCH, AMERICAN PRACTICAL NAVIGATOR
63 (Defense Mapping Agency HydrographirlI'opographic Center, 1984) (1802). One
nautical mile equals 6,076 ft.., and one statute mile is 5,280 ft.., therefore, the
speed limit in the harbor was roughly 5 miles per hour. See id. Since the WHISKEY RUNNER was traveling between 40 and 45 miles per hour, the boat was
moving at approximately 37 knots. See id. Therefore, the WHISKEY RUNNER was
traveling at an excessive speed at the time of the allision. Earles I, 935 F.2d at
1030; see supra note 8 for a definition of allision.
19. Earles I, 935 F.2d at 1030. "Oscar 8," the mooring buoy the WHISKEY
RUNNER allided with, was a steel white Navy buoy twelve feet in diameter and
riding approximately five feet above the water. Opening brief for Appellee at 6-7,
Sutton v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 92-55548). The
buoy was located approximately 300 yards inside the harbor and about 250 feet
outside the navigation channel. Id. One of eight identical buoys placed outside of
the channel and used to moor ammunition barges, Oscar 8 had no light, beacon,
or reflective tape. Id.
20. Earles I, 935 F.2d at 1030.
21. Id.
22. 1d.
23.Id.
24. Id. Although a blood alcohol content of .11% is in excess of the amount at
which an automobile driver would be considered legally drunk in most states, at
the time of this accident, no such law applied to the operator of a vessel. See
Opening brief for Appellant at 9, Earles 11 (No. 92-55548). However, as a result of
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Actions were brought on behalf of the five decedents under
the Suits in Admiralty Act25 (hereinafter "SIAA") against the
United States Government for negligence. 26 The plaintiffs alleged that the Government failed to warn of an obstruction to
navigation because Oscar 8 was not illuminated and the speed
limit inside the harbor was not adequately posted. 27 The United States impleaded Virl Earles, pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 14(c),2S alleging that he was the sole
cause of the accident and was therefore directly liable to the
petitioners. 29 The five consolidated cases for wrongful death,
against the United States and Mr. Earles, were bifurcated for
hearing on the issues of liability and damages. so
The trial court ruled that the Government and Mr. Earles

this tragic occurrence, Virl Earles was convicted in the West Orange County Municipal Court on five counts of manslaughter and was sentenced to prison. See
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Appellant at 11, Earles II
(No. 92-55548).
25. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1988). The Suits in Admiralty Act (hereinafter SIM)
is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity whereby the federal government consents to negligence liability in admiralty "in cases where . . . if a private person
or property were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained." 46
U.S.C. § 742. To illustrate the scope of the Earles II decision, it should be noted
that the government's liability arose as a private party's would, i.e., the existence
of a duty by the United States in Earles II is not due to its sovereignty. See id.
(emphasis added). The Earles II damages rule would likely apply under similar
facts to a corporation that maintains private buoys or other such maritime structures as part of its commercial operations, or a citizen who owns a dock that extends over navigable waters. See Perlman v. Valdes, 575 So. 2d 216, 217 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (parents of woman who died from injuries sustained when
speedboat in which she was a passenger struck unlighted, unused concrete pier
brought maritime wrongful death action against the pier owner, a real estate
trust); Complaint of Nobles, 842 F. Supp. 1430, 1432 (N.D. Fla. 1993) (involving
wrongful death of a ski boat passenger who died when the boat he was aboard
struck a privately owned boathouse).
26. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 906.
27. See id.
28. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 14(c), permits a defendant in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to act as a third-party plaintiff for the purpose of
impleading a third-party defendant who may be partially or fully liable directly to
the original plaintiff. FEn. R. CIV. P. 14(c). The practice is unique to maritime law
in that the original action proceeds "as if the plaintiff had commenced [the action)
against the third-party defendant." [d. Thus, the third-party defendant in admiralty jurisdiction may be directly liable to the original plaintiff, not merely liable for
indemnity to the third-party plaintiff as is normally the practice. [d.
29. Earles 1, 935 F.2d at 1030; Opening brief for Appellant at 2, Earles II (No.
92-55548).
30. Earles 1, 935 F.2d at 1030.
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were equally responsible for the accident. 31 After the trial on
wrongful death damages,32 judgment was entered awarding
the non-dependent parents of the decedents substantial recovery for loss of society.33 The Government appealed the issues
of liability and damages. 34

31. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 907. This case was before the Ninth Circuit on appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
James M. Ideman, District Judge, Presiding. Opening brief for Appellant at 2-3,
Earles II (No. 92-55548). Argued and submitted March 17, 1988 in Los Angeles,
California. Id.
32. A damages trial was held in the district court on April 12th and 13th,
1988. Opening brief for Appellant at 3, Earles II (No. 92-55548).
33. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915. In addition to amounts awarded for loss of support, total damages for loss of society awarded by the district court were
$1,089,900.00, or 49% of the entire judgment, $2,206,091.19. See Opening brief for
Appellant at 5, Earles II (No. 92-55548); Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Appellant at 7-11, Earles II (No. 92-55548).
34. Earles II, 26 F.2d at 906. Although the District Court found the government and Mr. Earles equally at fault, because there was no likelihood of recovery
from Mr. Earles (above that awarded as off-set from his award against the government), the beneficiaries' only effort to pursue their remedies was against the government which was held jointly and severally liable for the total judgment of
$2,206,091.19. Opening brief for Appellant at 5, Earles II (No. 92-55548). Thus, the
government alone appealed. Earles 1, 935 F.2d at 1030. The government contested
liability by arguing that the Discretionary Function Exception that is specifically
enunciated in the Federal Torts Claim Act also applied to the SIAA. Earles II, 26
F.3d at 906; Earles 1, 935 F.2d at 1030-32. The Federal Torts Claim Act (hereinafter "FTCA") is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity whereby the federal government consents to negligence liability for damage or loss of property, or negligence
or death arising from the negligent wrongful acts or omissions of all federal employees acting within the scope of their employment. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2679(b), 2679(d)
(1988). Essentially, the FTCA is to land-based law, as the SIAA is to admiralty
and maritime law, however, the SIAA does not expressly immunize the government for the exercise of discretionary functions. Earles 1, 935 F.2d at 1031 (quoting Sheridan Transp. Co. v. United States, 897 F.2d 795, 798 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990».
The Discretionary Function Exception is a qualification to the general waiver of
sovereign immunity granted by the Federal Torts Claim Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)
(1988). The statutory exception states, in pertinent part, that a claim cannot be
maintained against the United States when the claim is "based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether
or not the discretion involved be abused." Id. The exception is grounded in concern
for keeping separation of powers intact when sovereign immunity is waived, because when the government is sued, government conduct necessarily comes under
judicial scrutiny. Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 102122 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, the legislative rationale for the exception is that "Congress wished to prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and administrative
decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of
an action in tort." Earles 1, 935 F.2d at 1031 (quoting United States v. S.A.
Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. 797, 813-14 (1984». The Ninth
Circuit in Earles 1 agreed with the government on the application of the Discre-
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The Ninth Circuit considered the appeal in Earles v. United States 35 ("Earles F') and remanded on the issue of government liability without reaching the question of damages. 36 On
remand, the district court amended its original judgment, once
more finding the United States liable. 37 Therefore, in Earles II
the United States renewed its appeal on the issues of liability
and damages, asserting that consistent with the spirit of a
recent Supreme Court decision38 the non-dependent parents of
non-seamen could not recover for loss of society.39
III. BACKGROUND
Loss of society damages are those damages in a maritime
wrongful death action which compensate the decedent's beneficiary for deprivation of the decedent's continued existence,
including: love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and protection. 40 Loss of society damages are a non-pecuniary41 element of maritime wrongful death recovery.42 The

tionary Function Exception to the SIAA. Earles I, 935 F.2d at 1032; see also
Earles II, 26 F.3d at 906 (noting that every circuit but one that has considered
the question has read the exception into the SIAA). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
vacated the district court's finding of liability and remanded for a determination of
whether the Navy's decisions, including, not to adequately post a speed limit and
not to illuminate Oscar 8, were discretionary policy acts that fell within the Discretionary Function Exception barring recovery. Earles I, 935 F.2d at 1032; see
also Earles II, 26 F.3d at 906.
35. Earles v. United States ("Earles I"), 935 F.2d 1028, 1029-30 (9th Cir.
1991), appeal after remand, Sutton v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903 (9th Cir.
1994).
36. Earles I, 935 F.2d at 1032.
37. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 906 n.1.
38. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 30-33 (1990) (holding that the
parent of a seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society
damages under general maritime law).
39. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-15.
40. Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585 (1974).
41. Pecuniary damages are recovery for loss that can be estimated and compensated in money. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 392 (6th ed. 1990). Pecuniary damages may include amounts for depravation, injury, loss of rights, or other loss that
can be calculated or recompensed in money. Id. Admiralty courts, however, generally hold that pecuniary damages are that amount for loss of money or salable
property by the plaintiff for which compensation is awarded. See Miles v. Apex
Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32-33 (1990). Thus, admiralty courts hold that under
the general maritime law, loss of society damages are non-pecuniary in nature.
Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 583-91 (emphasis added).
42. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 585 n.17.
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doctrine entered admiralty through the case of Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet,43 a longshoreman case,44 wherein the Supreme Court reasoned that extending elements of damages for
non-pecuniary loss would align maritime wrongful death law
with the majority of state wrongful death statutes that at that
time allowed recovery for non-pecuniary loss.45 Furthermore,
the Court reasoned that its rationale was in accord with the
well settled admiralty tenet of "special solicitude. "46
Special solicitude is an ancient tenet of the maritime law
of seamen based on both humanitarian and economic policy.47
Special solicitude treats seamen as the "wards of admiralty,"
protecting them from the harsh conditions of their employment, and in so doing, encourages seagoing to the ultimate
benefit of commerce. 48 Courts applying the doctrine of special
solicitude must balance it against another maritime law principle, that of uniformity.49
The doctrine of uniformity is the fundamental constitution-

43. 414 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1974) (holding the spouse of a longshoreman killed
in territorial waters could recover loss of society damages under general maritime
law).
44. At the time of this case, longshoremen, under the doctrine of "Sieracki
seaman," were extended protection under the general maritime law pursuant to
the same heightened standard of liability seamen derived from "special solicitude."
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 85, 99 (1946), reh'g denied, 328 U.S.
878 (1946). A "Sieracki seaman" was granted seaman-type privileges, because
courts reasoned, in their employment, longshoremen face analogous hazards as do
seamen and, like seamen, perform a function essential to maritime service aboard
ships. [d. Today however, that doctrine has been abolished by the 1972 amendments to the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, which gives maritime shore workers, such as longshoremen, federal statutory remedies. 44 Stat.
1424 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1988».
45. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 587-88.
46. ld. at 588.
47. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F.Cas. 480, 483 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (noting that the
principle of "special solicitude" is based on both protecting the generally improvident class of seamen and preserving it for the commercial service of the nation,
and moreover that the doctrine could be traced back to the medieval sea code, the
Rolls of Oleron). See also Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 577; Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 386-88 (1970); see supra note 5 for a discussion on special
solicitude.
48. Harden, 11 F.Cas. at 483.
49. See Lizabeth L. Burrell, Current Problems in Maritime Uniformity, 5 U.S.F.
MAR L.J. 67, 165 (1992) (noting that without uniformity, maritime practice would
be unmanageable).
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al principle defining federal admiralty jurisdiction, while entrusting to the district courts the power to develop maritime
law in harmony with each other.50 To ensure uniformity of
law the Constitution places admiralty and maritime cases in
federal court jurisdiction. 51 Application of the uniformity principle assures that maritime rules of decision are developed consistently throughout the nation so that federal policy regarding
marine transportation is implemented on a federal scale, thereby complementing the federal government's power to regulate
commerce. 52 Uniformity is especially important to admiralty
practitioners because it assures reliability and predictability of
the governing law regardless of where a client's vessel travels
or where a maritime tort arises. 53 Federal control of maritime
law is thus important because otherwise the transient nature
of vessel operations and the remote sites of maritime ventures
would frustrate the constitutional mandate. 54 Because maritime wrongful death recovery developed in reaction to immediate concerns, various causes of actions exist that incorporate
liabilities or impose damages differently from each other, producing a scheme of recovery wherein the constitutional principle is threatened. 55

50. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) at 573-75; Lizabeth L. Burrell, Current Problems in Maritime Uniformity, 5
U.S.F. MAR L.J. 67, 88 (1992) (noting that uniformity is at the heart of the district courts' grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction); supra note 14 for a
discussion on uniformity.
It should be noted that although the general maritime law is federal law,
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over some maritime actions and thus may
apply federal maritime rules of decision (the "general maritime law"), when appropriate, under the "saving to suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as codified
today in 28 U.S.C. § 1333. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988). A state court must apply
general maritime law rules when in conflict with state law in order to preserve
uniformity of the general maritime law despite its application across many jurisdictional forums. Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917); see also
Nelson" v. United States, 639 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1980).
51. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
52. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This clause, commonly referred to as the
"Commerce Clause," allocates the power to regulate commerce to the federal government. See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 573-75; see also Jensen, 244
U.S. at 216.
53. See Lizabeth L. Burrell, Current Problems in Maritime Uniformity, 5 U.S.F.
MAR L.J. 67, 165 (1992).
54. [d.
55. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1990) (noting that
admiralty courts that "supplement" statutory remedies in maritime wrongful death
actions must to so to achieve uniform vindication of national policy); see also Mobil
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Maritime wrongful death law is principally governed by
three separate causes of action, two statutory, and one courtmade. 56 First, under the Jones Act, beneficiaries may recover
for maritime wrongful death of a seaman from the seaman's
employer regardless of where the seaman's death occurred. 57
Second, recovery for wrongful death occurring further than
three nautical miles from shore is governed by The Death on
the High Seas Act (hereinafter "DOHSA,,).58 Third, claims
made for wrongful death of non-seamen in state territorial
waters (within three nautical miles from shore), may be
brought under the general maritime law in what is commonly
known as a "Moragne action."59
A. THE DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT AND THE JONES ACT:
FEDERAL STATUTORY CAUSES OF ACTION FOR MARITIME
WRONGFUL DEATH

In 1886, the Supreme Court decided The Harrisburg,60
which incorporated into American maritime jurisprudence the
common law rule that "a tort action dies with its possessor.,,61
The Court in The Harrisburg held that, absent a statutory
provision, no cause of action for wrongful death existed in
general maritime law. 62 Consistent with The Harrisburg, but
in an effort to mitigate its harsh rule, the Supreme Court in
1907 decided The Hamilton. 63 In The Hamilton, the Court
reasoned that, because no federal statute provided a remedy
for maritime wrongful death at that time, general maritime
Oil v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978) (noting that since Congres8 has
never enacted a comprehensive maritime code, courts that award maritime wrongful death damages must do so in a way that preserves the uniformity of maritime
law). See generally THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAw § 7-1,
at 235 (1987 & Supp. 1992) (noting "a crazy quilt pattern" of wrongful death actions is recognized in admiralty that was "jerry-built" on an ad-hoc basis over
many years of response to immediate concerns).
56. See supra note 12.
57. 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688
(1988».
. 58. 41 Stat. 537 (1920) (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-68 (1988».
59. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
60. 119 U.S. 199 (1886), overruled by Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398
U.S. 375 (1970).
61. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 204-05 (1886).
62. [d. at 213.
63. 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
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law could borrow state wrongful death statutes to provide
recovery to beneficiaries of maritime fatalities. 64 However, two
limitations were placed on beneficiaries who asserted maritime
wrongful death claims after The Hamilton: (1) not all states'
wrongful death statutes contemplated maritime fatalities when
they were enacted, and therefore, some states did not create a
right of action; and (2) even if the state created a claim, if the
maritime fatality did not take place within state territorial
waters where the statute had jurisdictional effect, no recovery
was available. 65 Therefore, after The Harrisburg and The
Hamilton, recovery for wrongful death in general maritime law
was piecemeal in territorial waters, and non-existent on the
high seas. 66
In 1920 Congress enacted DOHSA67 to preempt The Harrisburg and create a negligence based wrongful death action
for beneficiaries of "anyone" killed on the high seas. 66 In the
same year, Congress enacted The Jones Act,69 which also created a maritime negligence based wrongful death action, but
only for the beneficiaries of a "seaman.,,70

64. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 403·06 (1907).
65. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 393 n.10. (1970); see
supra note 6 and accompanying text for a definition of territorial waters.
66. Moragne, 398 U.S. 393 n.lO; see THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND
MARITIME LAw § 7·1, at 235 (1987 & Supp. 1992); see also GRANT GILMORE AND
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY, § 6·29, at 359 (2nd ed. 1975).
67. 41 Stat. 537 (1920) (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761·68 (1988».
68. [d. The Death on the High Seas Act !hereinafter "DOHSA"] states, in
pertinent part:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by
wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high
seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any
State, . . . the personal representatives of the decedent
may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of
the United States, in admiralty . . . .
[d. (emphasis added); see supra note 3 for an explanation of the preemptive effect
Congressional enactments have on the general maritime law.
69. 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688
(1988».
70. [d. When drafting the Jones Act, Congress did not formulate a unique
cause of action for seamen, but merely adopted, wholesale, the wrongful death
action that existed for railroad employees under the Federal Employers' Liability
Acts, 33 U.S.C. §§ 51·59 !hereinafter "FELA"I. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498
U.S. 19, 33 (1990). The Jones Act states, in pertinent part: "[Am statutes of the
United States modifying or extending the common·law right or remedy in cases
of ... [wrongful deathl to railroad employees shall apply . . . ." 46 U.S.C. app. §
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With regard to wrongful death actions, the Jones Act differs from DOHSA in three major respects. 71 First, beneficiaries asserting a Jones Act claim must establish seaman status
of the decedent as a prerequisite for recovery, while DOHSA
covers wrongful death regardless of status. 72 Second, Jones
Act beneficiaries recover for wrongful death whether the tort
occurred in territorial waters or on the high seas, while
DORSA governs only on the high seas. 73 Third, DORSA allows recovery for financial loss to all relatives who were dependent on the decedent, while under the Jones Act's schedule of
beneficiaries, claimants take by class. 74 When a prior class
has already recovered, members of a subsequent class are
precluded from recovering. 7S Therefore, in the case where a
member of a prior class has already recovered under the Jones
Act, the member of a subsequent class may be denied recovery,
even if financially dependent. 76 Notwithstanding the inconsistencies between statutes, the intent behind each was similar,
to abrogate the harsh results of The Harrisburg, and thereby
affect a federal policy of encouraging recovery for maritime
wrongful death. 77 However, maritime wrongful death recovery
under both federal maritime remedial statutes is limited to

688 (1988). See supra note 5 for a discussion on seaman status.
71. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988); 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-78 (1988). See also
GILMORE AND BLACK, supra note 66, §§ 6-29 to 6-31.
72. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988); 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-68 (1988). See
supra note 5 for a discussion on seaman status.
73. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988); 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-68 (1988).
74. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988); 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-68 (1988).
Section 761 of DORSA states, in pertinent part: "for the exclusive benefit of
the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative . . . ." 46 U.S.C.
app. § 761.
Section 51 of FELA, which is incorporated into the Jones Act by reference
in 46 U.S.C. app. § 688, states in pertinent part: "for the benefit of the surviving
widow or husband and children of such employee; -and, if none, then of such employees parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee. . . ." 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988) (emphasis added). Therefore, in the case where a
decedent seaman's spouse recovers under the Jones Act, the seaman's parent(s),
even if dependent, are barred from recovering. See GILMORE AND BLACK, supra
note 66, § 6-30, at 360-62 (2nd ed. 1975).
75. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988). See GILMORE AND BLACK, supra note 66, § 630, at 360-62 (2nd ed. 1975).
76. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988). See GILMORE AND BLACK, supra note 66, § 630, at 360-62 (2nd ed. 1975).
77. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914. See 41 Stat. 537 (1920) (codified at 46 U.S.C.
app. §§ 761-68 (1988»; 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920) (codified as amended at 46
U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988».
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damages for pecuniary loss.78
In enacting the maritime remedial statutory scheme, Congress reasoned that although recovery for wrongful death in
territorial waters might still vary among jurisdictions, state
statutes provided adequate remedies to non-seamen, and thus
Congress did not extend coverage to non-seamen under
DORSA, into territorial waters.79 The Jones Act, however,
was also enacted as part of the Merchant Marine .Act of
1920,80 which had the purpose of promoting a strong and viable American merchant marine to facilitate interstate and
foreign commerce as well as to respond to national emergencies. 81 Thus, Congress covered seamen both on the high seas
and in state territorial waters, reasoning that seamen were a
class of industrial workers entitled to "special solicitude" for
the harsh conditions of their employment, and that protecting
seamen from the incomplete recovery afforded under state law

78. Section 762 of DORSA states, in pertinent part: "The recovery in such suit
shall be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought. . . ." 46 U.S.C. app. § 762 (emphasis
added). In contrast, the Jones Act's limitation on pecuniary damages is not explicit, but incorporated by legislative intent from FELA, on which it is based. Miles,
498 U.S. 19, 33 (1990). In tum, FELA is based on the original wrongful death
statute, Lord Campbell's Act, which, as a well settled judicial matter, limits recovery to pecuniary damages only. Id.; see supra note 41 for a definition of pecuniary
damages.
79. R.R. REP. No. 10378, 66th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1920).
80. 41 Stat. 988 (1920). The maritime injury and wrongful death provision
commonly known as the Jones Act is found in the miscellaneous provisions section
of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 which collectively is titled "An Act To Provide
For The Promotion And Maintenance Of The American Merchant Marine. . . ." Id.
The first provision of the Act states:
[lIt is necessary for the national defense and for the proper growth of its foreign and domestic commerce that the
United States shall have a merchant marine of the best
equipped [personnel) and most suitable types of vessels
sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and
serve as a naval . . . auxiliary in time of war or national
emergency . . . and it is hereby declared to be the policy
of the United States to do whatever may be necessary to
develop and encourage the maintenance of . . . a merchant marine. . . .
Id.
81. 41 Stat. 988 (1920); see supra notes 5, 47-48 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the dual humanitarian and economic policy underlying this legislation; see also GILMORE AND BLACK, supra note 66, § 11-5, at 965-66 (noting provisions of the act were designed to "foster shipping").
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would be consistent with the principle of special solicitude and
encourage employment at sea. 82

B.

THE DOCTRINE OF UNSEAWORTHINESS: GENERAL MARITIME
LAw THEORY OF LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT

Along with Congressional enactment of the federal maritime wrongful death statutes, the Supreme Court has developed an alternative theory of liability under general maritime
law to further the policy of recovery for maritime torts, the
doctrine of unseaworthiness. 8s The doctrine of unseaworthiness is similar to strict liability,84 and therefore favors recovery.85 In the years following enactment of the maritime remedial statutory scheme, it became common practice in maritime
wrongful death cases for beneficiaries of a seaman to join their
Jones Act negligence claims with either a state wrongful death
claim based on the theory of unseaworthiness, if the death
occurred in state territorial waters, or a DOHSA claim founded
on unseaworthiness, if the death occurred on the high seas. 86
However, in 1964, the Supreme Court in Gillespie v. United
82. H.R. REP. No. 10378, 66th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1920).
83. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960) (holding that
under general maritime law the owner of a vessel is held to an implied warranty
that the vessel is reasonably fit for its intended use, and that that duty is independent of the shipowner's duty of reasonable care under the Jones Act); see also
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S 85, 94 (1946) (holding that unseaworthiness
may be maintained in a warranty claim and is a species of liability without fault).
reh'g denied, 328 U.S. 878 (1946); Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co.• 348 U.S. 336,
340 (1955) (holding that the warranty of seaworthiness extends to unfit
crewmembers analogizing that crewmembers are equally as vital to safety aboard
ship as a seaworthy hull); Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 101-02
(1944) (holding that the shipowner's duty of seaworthiness is absolute and nondelegable). The doctrine of unseaworthiness has its incubus in the proposition that
shipowners are liable for seamen's injuries that are caused by the unseaworthiness
of their vessel, or the failure to keep their vessel supplied with the proper fixtures. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
84. In tort law, strict liability is liability without fault that is imposed on one
who engages is an activity that involves inherent risk of injury. W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 75, at 534-38 (5th ed. 1984). The rationale of the tort law of strict liability is to discourage socially dangerous behavior.
while not entirely prohibiting any social benefit such behavior may have. [d. The
maritime law warranty of seaworthiness serves to discourage shipowners from
exacerbating the inherent risks of seagoing, while not prohibiting the social benefit
of marine operations. See Sieracki. 328 U.S. at 108.
85. See Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 108.
86. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 399-401 (1970).
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States Steel Corp.87 held that the Jones Act was the exclusive
remedy for a seaman's beneficiaries in territorial waters.88
The Court reasoned that since the Jones Act provided a remedy in territorial waters, it manifested federal maritime policy,
and therefore it was paramount over state wrongful death
statutes under the constitutional preference for uniformity.89
After Gillespie, a seaman's beneficiaries were no longer able to
bring state claims founded on unseaworthiness for wrongful
death in territorial water under The Hamilton, but could maintain Jones Act claims founded solely on negligence. 90 Therefore, when coupled with the rule of The Harrisburg, Gillespie
unintentionally effected a more generous remedy to the beneficiaries of some non-seamen than to the beneficiaries of seamen, for deaths occurring in territorial waters, in derogation of
the basic maritime law principle that seamen are entitled to
"special solicitude."91 By 1970, the overlap of, and gap between, state wrongful death statutes and the federal maritime
remedial statutory scheme, coupled with evolving doctrines in
the general maritime law, such as the doctrine of unseaworthiness, caused anomalies in recovery for wrongful death which
prompted the Supreme Court's attention. 92

87. 379 u.s. 148 (1964).
88. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 155 (1964). Cf.
Bodden v. American Offshore, Inc., 681 F.2d 319, 329 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that
DORSA provides the exclusive wrongful death remedy for unseaworthiness when a
seaman is killed outside state territorial waters).
89. Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 156; see supra notes 14, 49-55 and accompanying
text for a discussion on uniformity.
90. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 395-96 n.12. The Court in Gillespie decided that
the siblings of a deceased seaman could not join a state wrongful death claim
based on unseaworthiness with their mother's Jones Act wrongful death claim, reasoning that the siblings were precluded from recovering under the Jones Act's
schedule of beneficiaries. Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 155.
91. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 396 n.12; see supra notes 5, 47-48 and accompanying
text for a discussion on special solicitude.
92. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 395-97.
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C.

MORAGNE ACTION: GENERAL MARITIME LAw CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH

1.

Special Solicitude: The Humanitarian Policy of General
Maritime Law

In Moragne v. States Marine Lines,93 the Supreme Court,
in a unanimous decision, overturned The Harrisburg and established a cause of action for wrongful death in general maritime law. 94 In Moragne, the wife of a longshoreman96 killed
in territorial waters brought suit for wrongful death under
Florida's wrongful death statute asserting negligence and unseaworthiness. 96 However, because the state wrongful death
statute did not create an action based on unseaworthiness, and
according to The Harrisburg no cause of action for negligent
wrongful death was available when a non-seaman perished in
territorial waters, the widow was denied relief by the trial
court and, on appeal, by the Fifth Circuit. 97
The Supreme Court based its decision to overrule The
Harrisburg, and grant the widow relief, on two principles: (1)
the need for uniformity in maritime law,98 and (2) the aim to
provide "special solicitude" to those who bring suit in admiralty.99 The Court noted that after Gillespie, the beneficiaries of
seamen were provided less protection than the beneficiaries of
some non-seamen, and that its decision was designed to remedy this anomaly.loo

93.
94.
95.
96.

398 U.S. 375 (1970).
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 397-409 (1970).
See supra note 44 for a discussion on legal treatment of longshoremen.
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 376.
97. [d. at 376-77.
98. See supra notes 14, 49-55 and accompanying text for a discussion on uniformity.
99. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 386-88, 401, 403. It should be noted that a species of "special solicitude" applied to the decedent-longshoreman in Moragne, because at the time of that case courts were extending the warranty of unseaworthiness to longshoremen under the "Sieracki seaman" doctrine. See Seas Shipping Co.
v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 99 (1946), reh'g denied, 328 U.S. 878 (1946). The sweeping language of the holding in Moragne, however, appeared to extend "special
solicitude" to "all those who brought suit in admiralty jurisdiction."
100. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 395-96 n.12. The Court explained:
The . . . anomaly is that a true seaman - that is, a
member of a ship's company, covered by the Jones Act -
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After Moragne, recovery for maritime fatalities that occurred in state territorial waters was available to beneficiaries
of non-seamen in federal court, as it had been for deaths that
occurred on the high seas under DOHSA. 101 Moreover, recovery was consistent regardless of which state's territorial waters
the tort occurred in, because federal courts applied the general
maritime law uniformly.102 To provide additional support for
its departure from stare decisis, the Court reasoned that maritime law embodies civil law elements including unique equitable doctrines which grew apart from the common law and
which supported a general maritime law death remedy.103
Justice Harlan announced, "a 'special solicitude' for the welfare
of those [persons] who undertook to venture upon hazardous
and unpredictable sea voyages. "104
The recoverable elements of damages and standing to
recover in the general maritime wrongful death action
("Moragne action") were not decided. 105 The United States
Government, as amicus curiae, advocated that DOHSA's schedule of beneficiaries should be adopted for the new cause of ac-

is provided no remedy for death caused by unseaworthiness within territorial waters, while a longshoreman, to
whom the duty of seaworthiness was extended only because he performs work traditionally done by seamen,
does have such a remedy when allowed by a state statute.
[d.
101. [d. at 403.
102. [d. at 397-403.
103. [d. at 386-88. Justice Harlan announced:
Maritime law had always, in this country as in England,
been a thing apart from the common law. It was, to a
large extent, administered by different courts; it owed a
much greater debt to the civil law; and, from its focus on
a particular subject matter, it developed general principles
unknown to the common law. These principles included a
special solicitude for the welfare of those men who undertook to venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea
voyages.
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 386-88.
104. [d. Notwithstanding this broad language, Justice Harlan was apparently
referring to seamen and, at that time, maritime shore-workers. See Sistrunk v.
Circle Bar Drilling Co., 770 F.2d 455, 460 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 775 F.2d
301 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986); Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 99100.
105. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 405-08.
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tion. 106 In addressing the Government's argument, Justice
Harlan stated, "we think its final resolution should await further sifting through the lower courts in future litigation. "107
Despite its failure to resolve the damages issue, the Supreme
Court suggested that the lower courts look to existing remedial
legislation for analytical guidance. 108 Thus, the Supreme
Court created the possibility that the new maritime wrongful
death action, which was predicated in part on uniformity,
might allow non-uniform recovery.109
In Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet,l1O the Supreme Court
considered the scope and content of damages in a Moragne
action. III In a five to four decision, the Court allowed the
beneficiary of a longshoreman killed in state territorial waters
to recover loss of society damages. 112 First the Court defined
"loss of society" as "a broad range of mutual benefits each
family member receives from the others' continued existence,
including love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and protection."113 The Court then reasoned that since
the action was not controlled by statute, the Court was compelled to extend a remedy within general maritime law consistent with the guiding principle announced in Moragne which
was to show "special solicitude" to the beneficiaries of those
who are killed within admiralty jurisdiction. 1l4 The Court

106. [d. at 408.
107. [d.
108. [d.
109. See id.
110. 414 U.S. 573 (1974) (holding that loss of society damages are allowed as
an element of recovery in a Moragne action for death of a longshoreman in territorial waters).
111. Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1974).
112. [d. at 585-90.
113. [d. at 585.
114. [d. at 587-88. Because the Court in Gaudet used broad language that did
not limit loss of society to longshoremen in territorial waters only, many lower
courts have interpreted the Court's language in Gaudet as extending "special solicitude" beyond seamen, to all who bring suit in admiralty jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Sutton v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903, 917 (9th Cir. 1994). However, interpreting Gaudet to extend solicitude to non-seamen is arguably an over broad reading of that case because the decedent in Gaudet was not merely a "non-seaman,"
but was more precisely a "longshoreman," who at that time courts extended solicitude to as a "Sieracki seaman." See Gaudet, 414 U.S .. at 585-90; Sieracki, 328 U.S.
at 99. Thus, it can be asserted that Gaudet did not extend special solicitude beyond the realm of seamen, and therefore, the lower courts that have since done
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recognized that its decision permitted recovery for non-pecuniary damages that were prohibited in statutory maritime cases,
but reasoned that it was aligning the judge-made maritime
wrongful death remedy with the majority trend in the United
States which allowed loss of society by statute. 115 Thus, the
Supreme Court, not constrained by legislation in either
Moragne or Gaudet, appears to have favored incorporating
current legal developments outside the realm of maritime law
into admiralty jurisdiction despite departure from the principle
of admiralty uniformity.116 Nevertheless, later Supreme Court
decisions took a tack favoring uniformity.ll7
2.

Uniformity: The Touchstone of General Maritime Law

In Mobil Oil v. Higginbotham,118 the Supreme Court emphasized the traditional desire of the admiralty courts for uniformity and noted the potential conflict between the judgemade Moragne remedy and the remedies provided by Congress
in the federal maritime statutes. 119 In dealing with this conflict, the Court declined to award loss of society damages under
general maritime law to the beneficiary of a longshoreman
so. misapplied the Supreme Court's holding. See Walker v. Braus. 861 F.Supp.
527. 533 (E.D. La. 1994) (noting that Miles made it clear that general maritime
law beneficiaries should receive no more and no less solicitude than Jones Act
beneficiaries of seamen. and DOHSA beneficiaries of persons killed on the high
seas. because courts have interpreted Gaudet too broadly by their reliance on the
sweeping language of Moragne). remand before decision. 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.
1993).
115. Gaudet. 414 U.s. at 587-88 n.22.
116. See Moragne. 398 U.S. at 390 (noting that the Court's decision to create a
federal maritime wrongful death action was based in part on the fact that the law
of every state in the United States had evolved to the point where an action for
wrongful death existed by statute); Gaudet. 414 U.S. at 587-88 (noting that allowing loss of society into the general maritime law. aligned the general maritime
wrongful death remedy with the majority of state wrongful death statutes and the
majority trend in the United States to allow such recovery).
117. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.• 498 U.S. 19. 26-27 (1990) (noting that
admiralty courts that "supplement" statutory remedies in maritime wrongful death
actions must do so to achieve uniform vindication of national policy); Mobil Oil v.
Higginbotham. 436 U.S. 618. 625 (1978) (noting that since Congress has never
enacted a comprehensive maritime code. courts that award maritime wrongful
death damages must do so in a way that preserves the uniformity of maritime
law).
118. 436 U.S. 618 (1978) (holding that loss of society damages are not a remedy
in a Moragne action for a death that occurred on the high seas).
119. Mobil Oil v. Higginbotham. 436 U.S. 618. 622-26 (1978).
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killed on the high seas. 120 Because DORSA applied concurrently with a Moragne action, and DORSA expressly limits
damages to pecuniary loss, the Court reasoned it was precluded by Congressional intent from enhancing statutory recovery
with the judge-made loss of society remedy.121 The Court reasoned that, "[DORSA] does not address every issue of wrongful-death law, ... but when it does speak directly to a question, the courts are not free to 'supplement' Congress' answer
so thoroughly that the Act becomes meaningless."122 Addressing the anomaly that Gaudet allowed loss of society damages
for a death in territorial waters while DORSA did not allow
non-pecuniary damages for a death on the high seas, the Court
reasoned that loss of society awards under Gaudet were not a
major threat to overall uniformity because their propriety
could be scrutinized if they ever became a "substantial portion
of the [beneficiary's] recovery. "123 The Supreme Court thus
endorsed minor disparities between recovery available for
wrongful death on the high seas and in territorial waters. 124
In 1990, the Supreme Court employed the analytical
framework of Higginbotham to decide Miles u. Apex Marine
Corp.125 Although in Miles the Supreme Court stressed the
need for uniformity of recovery in maritime actions, the Court
refused to overrule Gaudet. 126 The Court in Miles limited

120. [d. By the time Higginbotham was decided in 1978, the general maritime
law doctrine which extended special solicitude to longshoremen had been abolished
by the 1972 amendments to the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, which gives maritime shore workers, such as longshoremen, federal statutory
remedies. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(1988».
121. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 622-26.
122. [d. at 625.
123. [d. at 624 n.20; see also, W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS § 127, at 952 n.81 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that the Supreme Court has
not yet decided the issue which its dicta in Higginbotham raised, namely whether
awards for loss of society must be primarily symbolic rather than a substantial
portion of recovery).
124. See Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 624 n.20; but cf. KEETON, supra note 123
(noting that on occasion substantial awards for loss of society have been made in
jurisdictions allowing such recovery in step with a general trend in American jurisprudence toward expanding tort liability).
125. 498 U.S. 19, 30-33 (1990) (holding that the parent of a seaman killed in
territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime
law); Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 622-26.
126. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 31-32 (1990).
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Gaudet to its facts announcing, "[t]he holding of Gaudet applies only in territorial waters, and it applies only to longshoremen.,,127 The Supreme Court decided Miles in an effort
to restore uniformity to the maritime law of seamen. 128
In Miles the Supreme Court held that loss of society is not
among the elements of damages allowed to the beneficiaries of
Jones Act seamen in wrongful death actions brought under
general maritime law for unseaworthiness. 129 The Court denied loss of society to the non-dependent mother of a seaman
knifed to death by a fellow crewmember onboard the ship on
which he was employed while the ship lay alongside a berth in
Washington State territorial waters.130 The Court reasoned
that recovery for non-pecuniary loss, such as loss of society,
was foreclosed in a general maritime law wrongful death action for death of a seaman, because the Jones Act, which controls recovery for the judicially protected class of seamen, limits recovery to pecuniary 10SS.131 The Court's reasoning emphasized that when a Jones Act claim is joined with an over-

127. [d. at 31.
128. [d. at 37. Justice O'Connor wrote:
Cognizant of the constitutional relationship between the
courts and Congress, we today act in accordance with the
uniform plan of maritime tort law Congress created in
DOHSA and the Jones Act. We hold that there is a general maritime cause of action for the wrongful death of a
seaman, but that damages recoverable in such an action
do not include loss of society.
[d.
129. [d.; see supra notes 83-85 for a discussion of unseaworthiness.
130. Miles, 498 U.S. at 37. See generally Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348
U.S. 336, 340 (1955) (holding that in an action against a shipowner for injuries
resulting from an assault by a fellow crewmember, evidence that the assailant had
such a savage disposition so as to endanger others working on the ship, that he
had a propensity for violence greater than that of the ordinary person of that
calling, and that a crew with assailant as a member was not competent to meet
the contingencies of a sea voyage, is sufficient to support an action for breach of
the warranty of seaworthiness).
131. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32-33. Although the Jones Act does not expressly limit
damages to pecuniary loss, the Court reasoned, "When Congress passed the Jones
Act, ... [i]ncorporating FELA ... Congress must have intended to incorporate
[FELA's] pecuniary limitation on damages as well." [d. Herein the Court missed
an opportunity to interpret FELA's pecuniary damages limitation out of the Jones
Act, in line with the policy of special solicitude and evolving doctrines of tort
recovery in the common law. See id.; see supra note 41 for a definition of pecuniary damages.
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lapping claim under the general maritime law for loss of society, uniformity with legislative intent dictates that the Jones
Act's pecuniary damages limitation preclude recovery for loss
of society.132 Thus, Moragne-Gaudet and Higginbotham-Miles
demonstrate how the Supreme Court has struggled to provide
both special solicitude and uniformity in admiralty while adhering to its own place in the constitutional scheme. 133
3.

Doctrinal Conflict: Special Solicitude Versus Uniformity

Moragne and Gaudet appear to stand for the proposition
that the Court will sacrifice uniformity to keep pace with remedial developments outside of admiralty jurisdiction when
not preempted by statute. 134 Higginbotham and Miles stand
for the proposition that when a statute speaks directly to an
issue, the Court will not sacrifice uniformity between the
judge-made action and the Congressional enactment to allow
relief beyond what Congress has dictated. 135 Therefore, as a
result of the overlap of, and gap between, Congressional enactments and Supreme Court jurisprudence, the issue of whether
to award loss of society damages to the beneficiaries of nonseamen killed in territorial waters when neither the Jones Act
nor DOHSA apply has been left open. 13S Furthermore, the

132. Miles, 498 U.S. at 26-30. The Court announced:
We no longer live in an era when seamen and their loved
ones must look primarily to the courts as a source of substantive legal protection from . . . death; Congress . . .
!has) legislated extensively in [this area) . . . . In this era,
an admiralty court should look primarily to these legislative enactments for policy guidance. We may supplement
these statutory remedies where doing so would achieve
the uniform vindication of such policies consistent with
our constitutional mandate, but we must also keep strictly
within the limits imposed by Congress.
1d. at 27. Herein, Justice O'Connor appeared to abrogate the policy of special
solicitude toward seamen in favor of the rather disingenuous notion that modem
seamen need not look to the courts for protection, because Congress has already
provided them protection by means of the Jones Act (including its well established
pecuniary limitation). See id.
133. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 30-33; see also Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 622-26;
Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 585-90; Moragne, 398 U.S. at 397-409.
134. See Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 585-90; Moragne, 398 U.S. at 397-409.
135. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 30-33; Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 622-26.
136. See Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 535 (E.n. La. 1994) (holding by
direction of the Fifth Circuit that Miles' emphasis on uniformity in maritime law
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question remains after Miles, if loss of society damages are a
remedy in a Moragne action, whether the parents of non-seamen are allowed to recover such damages without showing
that they were financial dependents of the decedent.137

compelled the decision that the dependent beneficiaries of a non-seaman killed in
territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime
law), remand before decision, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993); Choat v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 1994 A.M.C. 2626, 2640 (Ala. 1994) (holding that Miles' emphasis on
uniformity in maritime law compelled the decision that the beneficiaries of a maritime fatality could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime
law); Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc. v. Estate of Dau Van Tran, 808 S.W.2d
61, 63 (Tex. 1991) (holding that Miles' emphasis on uniformity in maritime law
compelled the decision that the beneficiaries of a maritime fatality could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime law). But see Earles II, 26 F.3d
at 917 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that because neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA applied, the court was free to affirm substantial awards for loss of society made to
the non-dependent parents of non-seamen killed in territorial waters); cf. Emery v.
Rock Island Boatworks, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 114, 116-18 (E.D. Ill. 1994) (holding
that the spouse of a non-seaman injured in state waters may recover loss of society damages because neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA applied to preclude or
limit damages). See generally Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 585-90 (granting lower courts
sitting in admiralty the discretion to award loss of society damages on a case-bycase basis because, although such awards are non-pecuniary, they are measurable,
and courts have demonstrated their ability to control excessive awards); THOMAS J.
SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAw § 8-3, at 476 (Practitioner's ed.
1994) (noting that Miles, by deciding the treatment of seamen and longshoremen,
solved one discrepancy in uniformity to create another, the treatment of non-seamen).
137. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., No. 93-7490, 1994 WL 685690, at
*3-4 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1994) (holding that federal maritime law does not allow recovery for loss of society to non-dependent family members); Air Disaster at
Lockerbie Scotland on December 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804, 828-30 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that federal maritime law does not allow recovery for loss of society to
non-dependent family members); Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd., 4
F.3d 1084, 1090-93 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the non-dependent parents of a
non-seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages
under general maritime law), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1060 (1994); Anderson v.
Whittaker Corp., 894 F.2d 804, 811-12 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the non-dependent parents of non-seamen killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of
society damages under general maritime law); Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 989
(5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the non-dependent parent of a seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime
law), affd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990); Cantore v.
Blue Lagoon Water Sports, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1151, 1152-55 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that the parents of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters could recover loss
of society damages under general maritime law only if they were financial dependents of the decedent); Lipworth v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A., 592 So. 2d
1151, 1154-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding the non-dependent parents of
non-seamen killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages
under general maritime law); Perlman v. Valdes, 575 So. 2d 216, 217 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the non-dependent parents of a non-seaman killed in
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MILES' EFFECT ON THE ELEMENTS OF DAMAGES ALLOWED

IN A GENERAL MARITIME WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION

Since Miles, lower courts have steered all points of the
compass in an effort to apply the Supreme Court's dicta on
non-pecuniary damages in cases dealing with non-seamen. 138
Some courts interpret Miles broadly, applying the uniformity
principle to preclude loss of society in all general maritime
cases except those authorized by the Supreme Court. 139 The

territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime
law). But see Earles 11, 26 F.3d at 917 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that loss of society
damages could be awarded to the parents of non·seamen killed in territorial waters regardless of dependency); cf. Randall v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888,
903-04 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the dependent beneficiaries of a longshoreman
killed in territorial waters could recover loss of society damages regardless of dependency); Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 538 (holding by direction of the Fifth Circuit
that the dependent family members of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters
could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime law regardless of
dependency); Choat, 1994 A.M.C. at 2640 (holding that the non-dependent mother
of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages regardless of dependency). See generally, SCHOENBAUM, supra note 136 § 8-3,
at 476 n.36 (noting that because Miles was based on the preclusive effect of the
Jones Act, loss of society could still be available to the beneficiaries of non-seamen, but that such awards were only allowed to parents who were financially
dependent on the decedent).
138. See Steven K. Carr, Living and Dying in the Post-Miles World: A Review
of Compensatory and Punitive Damages Following Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 68
TuL. L. REV. 595, 598 n.19 (1994) (noting that, post-Miles, lower courts which
ignore the Supreme Court's broader call for uniform remedies in maritime law are
in the minority and risk the scrutiny of appellate review).
139. The Supreme Court in Miles declined to overrule Gaudet. Miles v. Apex
Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 31-32 (1990). However, in limiting Gaudet to its facts
the Court stated: "[tlhe holding of Gaudet applies only in territorial waters, and it
applies only to longshoremen." Id. Some courts have connoted from reading this
passage, together with the emphasis the Supreme Court placed on uniformity of
recovery in Miles, that loss of society is implicitly prohibited in general maritime
law to all but "longshoremen in territorial waters." See Walker v. Braus, 995 F.2d
77, 82 (5th Cir. 1993) (remanding with directions to the district court that to
allow the widow of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters to recover loss of
society "would directly contradict the policy of uniformity emphasized and relied on
by the [Supremel Court in Miles); see also Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc. v.
Estate of Dau Van Tran, 808 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1991) (declining to award loss of
society damages to the beneficiaries of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters,
because he was not a longshoreman); but see Smallwood v. American Trading &
Transp. Co., 839 F. Supp. 1377, 1384-85 (holding that loss of society damages
could not be awarded to the beneficiaries of a longshoreman killed in territorial
waters under the general maritime law because of Miles' limitation on Gaudet
coupled with the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA); cf. Randall v. Chevron,
U.s.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888, 903 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that even though loss of
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Ninth Circuit and other courts limit Miles to seamen's cases,
and hold that when not compelled by legislation, such as the
Jones Act, the general maritime law requires awarding extended remedies to beneficiaries of non-seamen even if inconsistent
with the limited recovery allowed to statutory suitors.14o One
interesting development born out of the courts' struggle is the
application of a judicially-fashioned financial dependency requirement as a prerequisite for awarding parents of maritime
fatalities loss of society damages. 141
Only eight days before the Earles II opmIon was published, the Alabama Supreme Court, applying general maritime law, declined to award recovery for loss of society to a
non-dependent parent of a non-seaman killed in state territorial waters. 142 Since Earles II, the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, deciding a case on remand from the
Fifth Circuit, declined to follow Earles II, criticizing the Ninth
Circuit's treatment of the damages issue. 143 The Ninth Cir-

society damages were "severely limited" in Miles, under general maritime law, the
beneficiaries of a longshoreman killed in territorial waters could recover loss of
society damages pursuant to Miles' limitation on Ga.udet); Miles, 498 U.S. at 31
n.l (noting that, "[als with Moragne, the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA have
rendered Gaudet inapplicable on its facts.").
140. Sutton v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903, 914-17 (9th Cir. 1994); cf. Emery v. Rock Island Boatworks, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 114, 116-18 (E.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that the spouse of a non-seaman injured in state waters could recover loss of
society damages because neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA applied to preclude or
limit damages); Schumacher v. Cooper, 850 F. Supp. 438, 453-54 (D. S.C. 1994)
(holding that the dependents of a non-seaman injured in state waters could recover loss of society damages because neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA applied to
preclude or limit damages). But see Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d
1398, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1994) (declining to award loss of society damages to the
dependent family members of a non-seaman injured on the high seas, because
DOHSA denies such recovery to the beneficiaries of those killed on the high seas,
plus, the Supreme Court emphasized uniformity of damages among maritime tort
actions in Miles).
141. See Cantore v. Blue Lagoon Water Sports, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1151, 1152-55
(S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that maritime wrongful death plaintiffs may recover loss
of society damages for the death of non-seamen in territorial waters only if they
are financial dependents of the decedent).
142. Choat v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 1994 A.M.C. 2626 (Ala. 1994) (not otherwise reported).
143. See Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 535 <E.D. La. 1994) (holding by
direction of the Fifth Circuit that Miles' emphasis on uniformity in maritime law
compelled the decision that the dependent beneficiaries of a non-seaman killed in
territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime
law), remand before decision, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993); but see Earles II, 26
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cuit itself issued two seemingly inconsistent decisions soon
after publishing Earles 11.144 The Second Circuit has also issued two recent opinions on point, both holding that under
general maritime law, only dependent relatives may recover
damages for loss of society.145 Nevertheless, one district court
within the Seventh Circuit recently used the same approach to
the damages issue as the Ninth Circuit used in Earles II.146
Although a split among the Federal Circuits has developed, the
Supreme Court has yet to adopt a rule that explicitly settles
the issue of who may recover loss of society damages when, as
in Earles II, non-seamen perish within territorial waters. 147
Thus, whether the Ninth Circuit correctly interpreted the law
of maritime wrongful death when, in Earles II, it plotted a
course for the future of loss of society damages in general maritime law, has yet to be determined. 148

F.3d at 914-17.
144. See Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding, 27 F.3d 426, 430 (9th Cir. 1994) (declining to award loss of society damages to the family members of a seaman in a
general maritime wrongful death action against a shipyard that was not a Jones
Act defendant, even though neither DORSA nor the Jones Act applied to preclude
or limit damages, because the underlying rationale for maritime wrongful death
actions is based on the need for uniformity as emphasized in Miles); Chan, 39
F.3d at 1407-08 (declining to award loss of society damages to the dependent family members of a non-seaman injured on the high seas, even though neither the
Jones Act nor DORSA applied, because DORSA denies such recovery to the beneficiaries of those killed on the high seas, plus, the Supreme Court emphasized
uniformity of damages among maritime tort actions in Miles).
145. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., No. 93-7490, 1994 WL 685690, at
*3-4 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1994); Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on December 21,
1988, 37 F.3d 804, 828-30 (2d Cir. 1994).
146. See Emery, 847 F. Supp. at 118 (holding that the spouse of a non-seaman
injured in state territorial waters could recover loss of society damages because
neither the Jones Act nor DORSA applied to preclude or limit damages). There is
no distinction between fatal and non-fatal injuries when awarding loss of society
damages under general maritime law. Cater v. Placid Oil, 760 F. Supp. 568, 571
(E.D. La. 1991).
147. See supra notes 10, 136-37 and accompanying text.
148. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917; but see Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1090-93 (holding that the non-dependent parents of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters
could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime law); Miles v.
Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 989 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the non-dependent parent
of a seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages
under general maritime law), affd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S.
19 (1990); Anderson, 894 F.2d 804, 811-12 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the nondependent parents of non-seamen killed in territorial waters could not recover loss
of society damages under general maritime law); Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 536
(criticizing Earles II as inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Miles,
because the court in Earles II created a non-uniform scheme of recovery under
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E.

Loss

1.

The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits: Trend to Eliminate Loss
Of Society Damages from General Maritime Law

a.

Fifth Circuit

OF SOCIETY ISSUE IN THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT
COURTS

The rule of general maritime wrongful death reqUlnng
that loss of society only be awarded to financially dependent
beneficiaries has its genesis in the Fifth Circuit's 1985 decision
in Sistrunk v. Circle Bar Drilling CO. 149 Sistrunk held that
the non-dependent parents of deceased seamen killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society under general
maritime law when the seamen were survived by spouses or
children. 15o In doing so, the court denied relief to the non-'
dependent parents of two brothers who died when the drilling
vessel they worked on capsized in Louisiana state waters.151
The court commenced its analysis noting that it was guided by
general maritime case law. 152 DOHSA did not apply because
the deaths took place in territorial waters.153 Although the
Jones Act applied, because the parents' claims were precluded
by the spouses' and childrens' claims under the Jones Act's
schedule of beneficiaries, the issue was whether the parents
could recover loss of society damages relying on Gaudet in a
general maritime law wrongful death action under
Moragne. 154 Employing the analytical framework of Moragne,
the court reasoned it was guided by the "twin aims" of admiralty: "achieving uniformity in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction and providing special solicitude to seamen.,,155
In Sistrunk, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that denying loss of
society would provide more uniformity to maritime law because
maritime law within the Ninth Circuit and among federal circuits).
149. 770 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 775 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986).
150. Sistrunk v. Circle Bar Drilling Co., 770 F.2d 455, 459·60 (5th Cir. 1985).
151. [d.
152. [d.
153. [d.
154. [d. at 458.
155. Sistrunk, 770 F.2d at 458.
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parents similarly situated as the plaintiffs were denied standing under the Jones Act, and could not recover such damages
under DOHSA or the general maritime law if the deaths had
occurred on the high seas. 156 Regarding special solicitude, the
court reasoned that because the rationale behind the principle
is to benefit seamen's dependents, and that since the parents
were not dependent on the decedent-seamen, the principle did
not apply under the facts of the case. 157 The court announced:
To the extent that the purpose of admiralty's
special solicitude to the survivors of seamen is to
provide for their financial support, the special
solicitude aim of admiralty has no relevance in
this case. The parents in this case were not
dependent on their sons. If a purpose of the
solicitude is to provide the survivors peace of
mind both before a seaman undertakes to venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea
voyages and after the death of the seaman,
admiralty's special solicitude does not automatically mean that the parents in this case should
recover. As stated above, the parents could not
recover if the seamen's deaths occurred on the
high seas .... Admiralty cannot provide the
parents solicitude at a voyage's outset when
their right to recover for loss of society is dependent on the fortuity that the deaths occur in
territorial waters .... 158

This explanation for special solicitude given by the Sistrunk
court became the benchmark for later decisions which developed the dependency rule. 159
One year later, the Fifth Circuit published Patton-Tully
Transp. Co. v. Ratliff,16o wherein the court held that depen156. Id. at 459. Existence of spouses and children, preferred beneficiaries under
the Jones Act, precluded the parents' recovery. Id. Moreover, if the deaths had occurred on the high seas, DOHSA and Higginbotham would have limited the parent-beneficiaries recovery to pecuniary loss. Id.
157. Id. at 460.
158. Sistrunk, 770 F.2d at 460; see KiPLING, supra note 1, at 216.
159. See Cantore v. Blue Lagoon Water Sports, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1151, 1152-55
(S.D. Fla. 1992) (tracing the development of a financial dependency requirement
for the recovery of loss of society in general maritime law wrongful death actions).
160. 797 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1986).
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dent relatives of a Jones Act seaman could recover loss of society damages under general maritime law. 161 In Patton-Tully,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's loss of society
award under general maritime law. 162 The district court had
awarded loss of society to the dependent siblings of a seventeen year old skiff operator who drowned when his boat capsized while ferrying workers across the Mississippi River.163
The defendant had argued that the decedent qualified as a
Jones Act seaman, and thus the siblings were barred from
recovery under general maritime law by analogy to the Jones
Act's schedule of beneficiaries that allowed only one class of
beneficiary, the seamen's mother, to recover damages. l64 The
court reasoned, however, that because the policy behind awarding loss of society was "to insure compensation of the dependents for their losses resulting from the decedent's death," each
dependent of a family's sole source of income was entitled to
recover damages for loss of society under general maritime
law. 165 Finally, the court in Patton-Tully distinguished
Sistrunk because the parents in Sistrunk were non-dependents, whereas in Patton-Tully, all claimants were family
members and were financial dependents of the decedent, regardless of their familial relationship to him.l66 Patton-Tully
demonstrates that in an action where loss of society is permitted, certain conditions must be met with regard to loss before
the court may allow recovery. 167
The next case in this line, Truehart v. Blandon ,168 was
decided by the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana in the wake of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Sistrunk. The
court in Truehart extended the Sistrunk financial dependency
rule to non-seamen. 169 The court declined to award loss of society to the non-dependent parents and siblings of an adult
16l. Patton-Tully Transp. Co. v. Ratliff, 797 F.2d 206, 213 (5th Cir. 1986).
162. [d.
163. [d. at 208, 213.
164. [d. at 212.
165. [d. at 213 (quoting Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 583) (emphasis in original).
166. Patton-Tully, 797 F.2d at 213.
167. See id.; STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND
INJURY § 3:51, at 238-41 (3rd ed. 1992).
168. 672 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. La 1987). See Matthew E. Roy, Whittling Down
Loss of Society in Maritime Wrongful Death Actions, 14 TuL. MAR. L.J. 393 (1990).
169. Truehart v. Blandon, 672 F. Supp. 929, 937 (E.D. La 1987).
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pleasure boater who perished when the yacht he was aboard
allided with the causeway bridge on Lake Pontchartrain in
Louisiana. 170 Significantly, the district court's reliance on
Sistrunk's policy to award uniform recovery between statutory
maritime cases and Moragne actions contributed to the development of the financial dependency requirement. 171
The Truehart court addressed the anomaly in maritime
wrongful death recovery wherein Gaudet allowed loss of society
in Moragne actions, while DORSA and the Jones Act did
not. 172 The court harmonized the three remedial causes of action by using Higginbotham's admonition that non-pecuniary
damages should not be a disproportionately high percentage of
recovery in a Moragne action for death of a non-seaman in
territorial waters.173 The court concluded that whenever a
beneficiary is not financially dependent upon the decedent, loss
.of society should not be allowed. 174 The court reasoned that
whenever a beneficiary is not financially dependent upon the
decedent loss of society damages will necessarily be disproportionate to the amount of pecuniary loss, and therefore, pose a
significant threat to uniformity between recovery under the
remedial statutes and the general maritime law. 175 Thus, because the claimants in Truehart were non-dependent, and
hence loss of society was a "substantial portion" of their prayer
for relief, the court decided to draw a policy line at dependency
without regard to seaman status. 176 The court bolstered its
argument that dependency is the critical factor by citing
Patton-Tully's emphasis on the claimant's dependency, rather
than the claimant's mere familial relation to the decedent, as
allowing recovery.177 The court then concluded:
[T]his Court notes that somewhere a line must
be drawn between those who may recover for
loss of society and those who may not. The line
suggested in Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

[d. at 930.
[d. at 936-38.
[d. at 936.
[d.
Truehart, 672 F. Supp. at 936.
[d.
[d. at 936-37.
[d. at 937-38.
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opmIOns, the line between dependents and
nondependents, appears to be the most rational,
efficient and fair. A requirement of dependency
creates a finite, determinable class of beneficiaries.178

The significance of the Truehart court's reliance on the
policy behind Sistrunk to develop the dependency rule may
escape first glance. 179 However, because the Jones Act allows
recovery for seamen only, when the court in Sistrunk advocated uniformity between general maritime remedies and Jones
Act recovery, it implicitly favored uniformity in damages between non-seamen and seamen. 180 Moreover, the same logic
applies to DOH SA, because uniformity between DOHSA and
Moragne action recovery necessarily results in consistent damages for wrongful death whether on the high seas or in territorial waters.181 Thus, the scope of the dependency rule was defined when the Truehart court declined to distinguish Sistrunk
on the basis that it involved Jones Act seamen, reasoning that
it would be contrary to basic admiralty principles to extend
greater solicitude to the families of non-seamen than to families of seamen, the "wards of admiralty."182 In failing to distinguish Sistrunk as a case involving Jones Act seamen, the
Truehart court gave teeth to the proposition that only dependents may recover loss of society damages under general maritime law whether or not the death occurred in territorial waters or on the high seas and whether or not the decedent was a
seaman or a non-seaman. 183
In 1989, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana decided Neal v. Barisich, Inc. l84 In Neal, the court
held that parents of a seaman who drowned when he was
thrown overboard after two vessels collided on the Mississippi
River were not entitled to loss of society damages under gener-

178. Id. at 938.
179. See Truehart, 672 F. Supp. at 936·38.
180. See Sistrunk, 770 F.2d at 459.
181. See Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 624. "DOHSA should be the courts' primary
guide as they refine the nonstatutory death remedy, . . . because of the interest in
uniformity . . . ." Id.
182. See Truehart, 672 F. Supp. at 937.
183. See Cantore, 799 F. Supp. at 1152·55.
184. 707 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. La. 1989), affd, 889 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1989).
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al maritime law. 185 The court predicated its finding on dependency.186 The court reasoned that neither parent was allowed
to recover loss of society because the decedent's mother had not
lived with the decedent for many years and was not financially
dependent on him, and, although the decedent lived with his
father, the father was not a financial dependent of his son. 187
Since Neal was pre-Miles, the court began by noting that,
although loss of society damages were generally not allowed
under the Jones Act, non-pecuniary damages could be awarded
to the beneficiaries of seamen pursuing unseaworthiness
claims under general maritime law. 188 Next, the Neal court
noted that Truehart addressed substantially the same issue,
namely whether non-dependent parents have a right to recover
loss of society damages under general maritime law for the
wrongful death of their child. 1Sg The court further noted that,
although Truehart answered the question in the negative, the
Truehart court's notion of "dependency" was based on a pecuniary definition of the word "dependent...190 Thus, the Neal
court noted that Truehart left open the possibility a court
might give the term "dependency" a broader interpretation and
might base dependency on factors tending to prove a mutually
supportive relationship between the decedent and the beneficiary, such as whether they had continuously resided together
over a substantial period of time, rather than on financial
support alone.l9l Nonetheless, the court declined to go beyond
the plain meaning of the term "dependency" as defined in
Truehart, and did not give it any meaning other than financial
dependency. 192
The Neal court noted that, at that time, only six cases
existed under the general maritime law within the Fifth Circuit wherein parents had sought loss of society for the mari-

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Neal v. Barisich, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 862, 870-73 (E.D. La. 1989).
1d. at 872-73.
1d.
1d. at 870.
1d.
Neal, 707 F. Supp. at 870.
See id.
1d. at 872; see Truehart, 672 F.2d at 937.
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time wrongful death of their child. 193 The court noted that
Patton-Tully was the only one of these cases in which an
award was granted, but distinguished Patton-Tully from the
others on the fact that the parent in Patton-Tully was a financial dependent of her son. 194 Addressing the case at bar, the
court reasoned that the decedent's mother had not lived with
her son for many years, and was not financially dependent on
him, and thus held that her claim must be dismissed. 195
Next, the court considered whether the fact the decedent lived
with his father was enough to distinguish his claim from that
of the petitioners in Truehart. l96 Lacking a policy rationale
for making the common residency distinction determinative,
the court concluded, "admiralty law suggests no good reason
for treating nondependent surviving parents who had been
living with their deceased child any differently from those who
had not. Thus, the Court must dismiss the father's loss-ofsociety claim."197 Neal emphasizes the proposition in Sistrunk
and Truehart that financial dependency is the critical factor. 19B Moreover, like Patton-Tully, Neal demonstrates that in
deciding whether to award loss of society damages, a court
must analyze the facts presented by the case before extending
relief. 199 Finally, Neal represents the Fifth Circuit's reluctance to stray from uniformity at the expense of solicitude. 2°O
In 1990, the Supreme Court handed down Miles v. Apex
Marine Corp., affirming the Fifth Circuit's holding in Miles v.
Melrose,201 that in a general maritime wrongful death action
the non-dependent parent of a seaman could not recover for

193. Neal, 707 F. Supp. at 870-73.
194. [d.
195. [d. at 872.
196. [d.
197. [d. at 872-73; but see infra notes 534-43 and accompanying text for a discussion on factors admiralty courts might consider in determining whether a beneficiary could recover for loss of society.
198. See Neal, 707 F. Supp. at 870-73; see also Sistrunk, 770 F.2d at 458-60;
Truehart, 672 F. Supp. at 936-38.
199. See Neal, 707 F. Supp. at 870-73; see also Patton·Tully, 797 F.2d at 213;
SPEISER, supra note 167, § 3:51, at 238-41.
200. See Neal, 707 F. Supp. at 870-73; see also Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976,
989 (5th Cir. 1989), affd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19
(1990) ..
201. 882 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1989), affd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,
498 U.S. 19 (1990).
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loss of society. The Fifth Circuit had explained its decision by
implying that it was based more on policy than precedent:
Since loss of society is not a financial loss, restricting its recovery to dependents may seem
unwarranted. However, tort law has never recognized a principle of awarding redress to all
. who are injured by an event, however wide the
ripple .... The number of plaintiffs who could
allege noss of society] ... necessitates that we
draw a line between those who may recover ...
and those who may not. The line suggested by
the Supreme Court in Moragne and Gaudet, and
by our own court in Sistrunk, the line between
dependents and nondependents, "appears to be
the most rational efficient and fair.202
After the Supreme Court affirmed Miles, there has been a
trend in the Fifth Circuit to eliminate loss of society from the
general maritime law altogether. 203 However, the Fifth
Circuit's 1994 decision in Randall v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. 204
recognized that, even though Gaudet was severely limited to
its facts in Miles, loss of society is proper when a longshoreman
perishes in territorial waters. 205 The court affirmed substantial awards for loss of society to the wife and adult children of
a maritime worker who drowned when he fell into Louisiana
waters while being evacuated from an oil drilling platform
during a hurricane. 206 Although the court found the adult
children were financial dependents of the decedent, in dicta the
court addressed the defendant's reliance on the dependency
rule stating, "[iJn our view, the law of this circuit does not
unequivocally limit recovery of loss of society damages for the
wrongful death of a parent to children who are financially
dependent on the deceased. "207
However, the significance of the Fifth Circuit's decision in

202. Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 988-89 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Truehart,
672 F. Supp. at 938).
203. See Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 531-38 (E.D. La. 1994), remand
before decision, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993).
204. 13 F.3d 888 (5th Cir. 1994).
205. Randall v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888, 903 (5th Cir. 1994).
206. 1d. at 902-04.
207. 1d. at 903.
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Randall appears to be limited to its application under the
Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of Gaudet. 208 In fact,
the Fifth Circuit has since gone beyond the dependency rule
for recovery of loss of society in general maritime law toward
eliminating loss of society altogether from the panoply of remedies allowed for maritime wrongful death.209 This trend is a
result of the Fifth Circuit's broad reading of the uniformity
requirement emphasized in Miles, as well as a literal reading
of Miles' treatment of Gaudet. 210 Between the Supreme
Court's decision in Miles and the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Earles II, the Fifth Circuit declined to award loss of society to
beneficiaries in three of the four cases in which it considered
the issue.211 The only case in which loss of society damages
were awarded was in Randall where the court found Gaudet
was still good law. 212 The Fifth Circuit applied the Gaudet
damages rule to the facts of Randall to award the dependent
relatives of a longshoreman killed in territorial waters damages for loss of society. 213
b.

Eleventh Circuit

In 1992, a district court within the Eleventh Circuit decided Cantore v. Blue Lagoon Water Sports, Inc. 214 Cantore involved the wrongful death of a jet ski operator who died in a
collision with another jet ski on navigable waters in the Florida Keys.215 The court held that the parents of a non-seaman
208. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 31.
209. Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 533-38.
210. See id. at 533.
211. [d. In the three cases wherein the Fifth Circuit declined to award loss of
society damages, the court did so regardless of dependency. Nichols v. Petroleum
Helicopters, Inc., 17 F.3d 119, 122-23 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the dependent
beneficiaries of a longshoreman killed on the high seas could not recover loss of
society damages); Michel v. Total Transp., Inc., 957 F.2d 186, 191 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that the dependents of a seaman could not recover loss of society damages); Murry v. Anthony J. Bertucci Constr. Co., 958 F.2d 127, 129-32 (5th Cir.
1992) (holding that the wife of a seaman injured in territorial waters could not
recover loss of society damages), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 190 (1992).
212. See Randall, 13 F.3d at 903.
213. [d.
214. 799 F. Supp. 1151 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that maritime wrongful death
plaintiffs may recover loss of society damages for the death of non-seamen in
territorial waters only if they are financial dependents of the decedent).
215. Cantore v. Blue Lagoon Water Sports, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1151, 1152 (S.D.
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killed in territorial waters were entitled to loss of society in a
wrongful death action under general maritime law only if financial dependency is proven. 216 The Cantore court's decision
is significant because it provides a comprehensive and clear
post-Miles review of the elements of damages available for
wrongful death under general maritime law to beneficiaries of
non-seamen killed in territorial waters.217 Moreover, the decision traced the dependency requirement for awarding loss of
society and reached the conclusion that the trend is now settled law. 218
The Cantore court first noted the split of authority concerning whether beneficiaries may recover loss of society.219
The court then identified that, post-Miles, the trend was to
deny loss of society damages to non-dependents. 22o Addressing Miles' application to a non-seaman's case, the court stated
that Miles was persuasive, but not controlling. 221 Furthermore, the court noted that in a non-seaman's case, recovery
may be allowed, because neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA
applied. 222 However, turning to precedent, the court cited
Truehart for the proposition that distinguishing seamen cases
from non-seamen cases for the purpose of extending greater
recovery to non-seamen was contrary to the tenet of awarding
seamen, the "wards of admiralty," maritime law's most generous protection. 223 The court continued by citing Miles for the
proposition that the Supreme Court, in an effort to restore
uniformity to maritime law, intended to limit non-dependent
beneficiaries from recovering loss of society damages. 224
The thrust of the court's analysis in Cantore involved identifying dependency as the sine qua non 225 of recovery for loss

Fla. 1992).
216. [d. at 1155.
217. See id. at 1152-56; see also THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAw § 8-3, at 476 n.36 (Practitioner's ed. 1994).
218. Cantore, 799 F. Supp. at 1152-54.
219. [d. at 1152.
220. [d.
221. [d. at 1153.
222. [d.
223. Cantore, 799 F. Supp. at 1153.
224. [d.
225. Sine qua non is Latin for "without which not," i.e., the essence of some-
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of society in earlier decisions. 226 The court identified dependency as the critical factor in the Fifth Circuit cases, Truehart
and Sistrunk, as well as in the Sixth Circuit's decision in Anderson v. Whittaker Corp.,227 and numerous state cases applying federal maritime law. 228 The court concluded, "[a]s the
foregoing case law demonstrates, general maritime law has
moved toward a denial of recovery for loss of society where the
survivors are not dependent on the decedent."229 In following
Truehart's analysis, Cantore became the definitive post-Miles
case advocating dependency on the decedent as the bright line
rule for recovery of loss of society damages under general maritime law. 230
Although Cantore has been cited by at least one learned
treatise231 as exemplary of the damages allowed to a nonseaman's beneficiary in a Moragne action, in 1993, another
. district court within the Eleventh Circuit indicated in dicta
that Cantore was bad law.232 In Complaint of Nobles 233
("Nobles"), the District Court for the Northern District of Florida addressed maritime claims for loss of support,234 as well
as for loss of society.235 The claims were brought by the parents of a boy who was killed when the ski boat he was aboard
struck a boat house in Florida State territorial waters.236 Addressing the claim for loss of support, the court followed precedent in holding that the parents could not recover absent a

thing. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1385 (6th ed. 1990).
226. Cantore, 799 F. Supp. at 1152·56.
227. 894 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1990); see infra notes 348·57 and accompanying text
for a discussion on Anderson.
228. Cantore, 799 F. Supp. at 1153·54.
229. [d. at 1155.
230. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAw § 8·3, at 476 n.36
(Practitioner's ed. 1994).
231. [d.
232. Complaint of Nobles ("Nobles
842 F. Supp. 1430, 1434 n.8 (N.D. Fla.
1993).
233. 842 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
234. Nobles, 842 F. Supp. at 1434. Loss of support under general maritime law
includes all the financial contributions that the decedent would have made to his
dependents had he lived, 'and therefore it is a pecuniary element of damages. Sea·
Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 584·85 (1974). See supra note 41 for a
definition of pecuniary damages.
235. Nobles, 842 F. Supp. at 1434.
236. [d. at 1432.
b

),
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showing of financial dependency on the child. 237 Nevertheless,
the court did not strike the parents' claim for loss of society.238 Criticizing Cantore, the court noted, "[t]his [c]ourt
finds that [the] reasoning that ties recovery for loss of society
to financial dependency strained, and, therefore, will not adhere to the conclusion reached in Cantore."239 As a result, the
court appeared to make a policy decision not to apply a pecuniary standard in awarding non-pecuniary damages. 24o
On May 27, 1994, just eight days before the Ninth Circuit
handed down Earles II, the Supreme Court of Alabama decided
Choat v. Kawasaki Motors Corp.241 Applying federal maritime
law under the "savings to suitors clause,,,242 the court followed precedent and held that in a general maritime wrongful
death action Miles precluded recovery of non-pecuniary damages, such as loss of society.243 The court denied loss of society
to the non-dependent mother of an eighteen year old woman
who died without spouse or issue when she was accidentally
struck by a jet ski on the Tennessee River in Alabama. 244 After tracing the history of maritime wrongful death, the court
interpreted Miles' emphasis on uniformity as the Supreme
Court's implicit adoption of the dissent's opinion in Gaudet,
which favored uniformity over extending remedies. 245 The
Alabama court thus asserted that Miles controlled the holding

237. 1d. at 1434.
238. 1d.
239. 1d. at 1434 n.8.
240. See Nobles, 842 F. Supp. at 1434 n.8.
241. 1994 A.M.C. 2626 (Ala. 1994) (not otherwise reported).
242. The "savings to suitors" clause of the United States Constitution, Article 3,
section 2, clause I, which extends federal judicial power over cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, provides for a plaintiff asserting an in personam admiralty claim to sue in a common law (state court) in an ordinary civil action, but
in such cases, the state court must apply the substantive rules of the maritime
law as they would have been applied if the claim had been instituted in admiralty
in federal court. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 <extending the judicial power of
the United States to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction). See 28
U.S.C. § 1333 (1988) (codifying the federal courts' authority to develop a substantive body of general maritime law); Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 254
(1917) (holding that state law that changes, modifies, or affects the interstate
uniformity of the general maritime law is unconstitutional).
243. Choat v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 1994 A.M.C. 2626, 2639-40 (Ala. 1994)
(not otherwise reported).
244. 1d.
245. 1d. at 2639.
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in Choat. 246
Addressing the parent's claim that Miles only applied to
seamen, the court noted that Miles expressly limited the holding of Gaudet to "longshoremen," and, therefore, Gaudet's loss
of society remedy did not apply to non-seamen that are not
longshoremen. 247 Therefore, the court concluded, the remedy
did not apply in Choat. 248 Moreover, in dicta the court cited
numerous post-Miles cases which denied loss of society under
general maritime law, regardless of dependency.249 In following precedent, and hence giving Miles the broadest application
possible, the Supreme Court of Alabama expressly abandoned
the dependency requirement for awarding non-pecuniary damages under general maritime law. 250 The court stated:
[Some] courts have implicitly or expressly rejected dependency as the sine qua non of recoverability. Therefore, we do not base our conclusion
on the ground that Choat was not financially
dependent on her daughter. Instead, ... we
interpret Miles as precluding recovery of nonpecuniary damages, such as... loss of society....251

The court gave no further support for its position that the
dependency rule was unsound. 252
As non-pecuniary damage awards ebb within the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits, the dependency rule has since spilled over
into other federal circuits. 253 If the Supreme Court overrules

246. [d.
247. [d.
248. Choat, 1994 A.M.C. at 2639-40.
249. [d.
250. 1d. at 2640.
251. [d.
252. See id.
253. See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., No. 93-7490, 1994 WL
685690, at *3-4 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1994) (holding that federal maritime law does not
allow recovery for loss of society to non-dependent family members); see also Air
Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on December 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804, 828-30 (2d Cir.
1994) (holding that federal maritime law does not allow recovery for los8 of society
to non-dependent family members); Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd.,
4 F.3d 1084, 1090-93 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that non-dependent parents of a nonseaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages under
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Gaudet, the dependency issue will become moot. 254 However,
if loss of society remains an element of recoverable damages in
maritime wrongful death, dependency will continue to be an
issue of contention until the Supreme Court rules on the matter.255 The Ninth Circuit considered these issues in Earles II,
and affirmed substantial awards for loss of society, regardless
of dependency.
2.

The Ninth Circuit: Dependents of Seamen Denied Loss of
Society

In 1982, the District Court for the Northern District of
California decided Glod v. American President Lines, Ltd. 256
In Glod, the court denied recovery to the non-dependent siblings of a Jones Act seaman who died when he fell from a
ladder while boarding his ship.257 At the time of the accident,
the vessel was docked in state territorial waters at Seattle,
Washington. 258 Although the siblings were the seaman's sole
surviving heirs, the court determined that the siblings were
not beneficiaries under the Jones Act, because they were not
dependent relatives. 259 The court then considered the siblings'
claim under the general maritime law. 260 The district court
reasoned that deference to the weight of Supreme Court authority in Higginbotham, which guides lower courts to use
DOHSA's schedule of beneficiaries when deciding who should

general maritime law), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1060 (1994); Anderson v. Whittaker
Corp., 894 F.2d 804, 811-12 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that non-dependent parents of
non-seamen killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages
under general maritime law).
254. See Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 535 (noting that by following the Fifth
Circuit's trend to eliminate loss of society damages from maritime law altogether,
and thus denying loss of society to the dependents non-seaman killed in territorial
waters, the dependency requirement for recovering loss of society damages under
general maritime law may no longer be viable).
255. See id.; but see Randall, 13 F.3d at 903 (awarding loss of society damages
to the adult dependent children of a longshoreman killed in territorial waters);
Earles 11, 26 F.3d at 914-17 (awarding loss of society damages to the non-dependent parents of adult non-seamen killed in territorial waters).
256. 547 F. Supp. 183 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
257. Glod v. American President Lines, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 183, 184 (N.D. Cal.
1982).
258. [d.
259. [d. at 184-85.
260. [d. at 185-86.
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recover under general maritime law, supported the conclusion
that non-dependents could not recover loss of society.261
Moreover, the court noted that the expansive recovery for loss
of society in Gaudet was predicated upon the majority of state
statutes which allowed recovery for loss of society in wrongful
death actions outside of the maritime arena. 262 The court reasoned that the underlying rationale in Gaudet was not applicable, because most states do not allow non-dependents to recover in a wrongful death action. 263 This, when coupled with
Higginbotham's admonition that DOHSA be the federal courts'
primary guide in a Moragne action, led the court to conclude
dependency was a determinative factor when awarding remedies for wrongful death under general maritime law. 264
In 1983, the Ninth Circuit decided Nygaard v. Peter Pan
Seafoods, Inc. 265 The court in Nygaard, deciding an issue similar to that later settled by the Supreme Court in Miles, held
that non-pecuniary losses, such as loss of society, could not be
recovered under the Jones Act. 266 The court denied recovery
for loss of society to the minor son of a seaman lost from a
fishing vessel in the Bering Sea. 267 The court noted that
Higginbotham denied loss of society under DOHSA, and also,
that the Supreme Court had not yet decided whether loss of
society was allowed under the Jones Act. 26B
In Nygaard, the Ninth Circuit considered whether, in light
of Moragne and· Gaudet, it would be more consistent with the
humanitarian policy manifest in the extension of remedies
under general maritime law to allow loss of society damages. 269 The Ninth Circuit looked to existing general maritime
precedent and followed the First and Fifth Circuits in holding
that loss of society was not recoverable. 270 In reaching its con-

261.
262.
263.
264.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

[d.

Glad, 547 F. Supp. at 186.
[d.
[d.
701 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1983).
Nygaard v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc., 701 F.2d 77, 79-80 (9th Cir. 1983).
[d. at 78, 80.
[d. at 79.
[d.
[d. at 80.
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clusion, the court also cited the Second Circuit's decision in
Igneri u. Compagnie de Transports Oceaniques 271 for the proposition that the Jones Act did not allow recovery ofnon-pecuniary loss, such as loss of society.272 Moreover, the court noted
that it agreed with the other circuits' reasoning that any injustice perpetuated by the rule against recovery for non-pecuniary
loss should be remedied by Congress. 273 The court observed
that "[d]eference to the First and Fifth Circuits, leads us [to
our conclusion that] ... Moragne and Gaudet are authorities
simply too oblique to justify a departure from settled law."274
Thus, the Ninth Circuit demonstrated that, at least with regard to seamen's recovery, its analysis was guided by uniformity among Federal Circuits and conformity with Congressional
intent, not humanitarian policies favorable to extending remedies. 275
In the same year as Nygaard, the District Court for the
Western District of Washington decided Weyer u. ABC Charterers, Inc. 276 Without the need to distinguish between the
decedent's status as a seaman or non-seaman, the court held
that a dependent divorced wife did not have standing to recover in a Moragne action. 277 Weyer involved an action brought
by the divorced wife of a deceased pleasure boater278 who had
been supporting his ex-wife pursuant to a dissolution contract.279 The court followed Glod, a seaman's case, reasoning
that Higginbotham had "laid to rest" any ambiguity that arose
as a result of Gaudet, and therefore, courts must look to
DORSA's schedule of beneficiaries to determine who is a beneficiary entitled to recover loss of society damages in a Moragne

271. 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964); see infra
notes 330-35 and accompanying text for a discussion on Igneri.
272. Nygaard, 701 F.2d at 79.
273. Id. at 80.
274. Id.
275. See id. at 79-80.
276. 558 F. Supp. 364 (W.O. Wash. 1983).
277. Weyer v. ABC Charterers, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 364, 364-67 (W.O. Wash.
1983).
278. The decedent was the charterer of a pleasure boat, and thus was a nonseaman. See Weyer, 558 F.2d at 365; McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S.
337, 355 (1991).
279. Weyer, 558 F.2d at 365.
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action. 280 The court expressly declined to fashion a federal
common law schedule of beneficiaries different from
DORSA. 281 Thus, the court chose the policy of uniformity
over the humanitarian policy when it rejected the ex-wife's
argument that restricting recovery for wrongful death to spouses, children, and dependent relatives would "unjustly exclude a
large number of beneficiaries who are truly dependent upon [a]
decedent and who suffer a pecuniary 10ss."282
Two years later, the Ninth Circuit considered Evich v.
Connelly.283 Evich involved a general maritime wrongful
death action by the non-dependent brothers of a seaman who
perished when the fishing vessel he worked aboard sank after
striking rocks off the coast of Alaska. 284 The court held that
non-dependent siblings of a deceased seaman could not maintain a Moragne action absent a showing of financial dependency on the decedent.285 After looking to the Jones Act's schedule of beneficiaries, and citing Glod for the proposition that the
Jones Act did not provide standing for non-dependent siblings,
the court concluded that no claim for wrongful death could be
maintained under the Jones Act. 286 The court determined
that the brothers could not bring a wrongful death claim under
general maritime law, because DORSA's schedule of beneficiaries precluded non-dependent relatives from recovery.287 The
court, absent a reason for distinguishing non-seamen and seamen cases, cited both Glod and Weyer reasoning that Moragne
actions were not allowed when brought by persons not included
in DORSA's schedule of beneficiaries. 28B Thus, the court concluded, recovery for maritime wrongful death under general
maritime law would require the seaman's brothers to prove

280. [d. at 366.
281. [d. at 366-67.
282. [d. at 366.
283. 759 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that by analogy to DOHSA, siblings
must prove dependency to recover damages in a general maritime wrongful death
action).
284. Evich v. Connelly, 759 F.2d 1432, 1433-34 (9th Cir. 1985) (incorporating
the facts of its companion case, Berg v. Chevron). See Berg v. Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc., 759 F.2d 1425, 1427-29 (9th Cir. 1985).
285. Evich, 759 F.2d at 1432-33.
286. [d. at 1433.
287. [d. at 1433-34.
288. See id.
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that they were dependent relatives. 2B9
Consistent with the analysis applied in Glod, Nygaard,
Weyer and Evich, the Ninth Circuit decided Bergen v. FIV St.
Patrick. 290 The issue was whether punitive damages were
available under general maritime law to supplement Jones Act
and DOHSA remedies. 291 However, the analysis is applicable
in deciding whether to award loss of society under general
maritime law, because punitive damages, like loss of society,
are non-pecuniary, and are therefore not generally allowed
when either of the federal remedial statutes apply.292

Bergen involved the abandonment of a fishing vessel by
her crew. 293 The fishing vessel had been rolled on its side in a
storm while operating on the high seas in the Gulf of Alaska. 294 When the vessel took on water, the unlicensed and unqualified master ordered her evacuated. 295 As a result, ten of
the twelve crewmembers died of exposure. 296 The boat was
later recovered still afloat.297 The Ninth Circuit disallowed
punitive damages against the vessel's owners, who knew the
boat's captain was unqualified, because Congress intended
DOHSA to preempt non-pecuniary damages when it applied. 29B The court cited Higginbotham, reasoning that "Congress did not limit DOHSA beneficiaries to recovery of their
pecuniary losses in order to encourage the creation of a nonpecuniary supplement.,,299 The court concluded that when a
DOHSA claim is joined with a Jones Act claim, neither statute
may be supplemented by the general maritime law. 30o
The court in Bergen had cause to consider dependency as

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id. at 1433-34.
816 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1987).
Bergen v. FN St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1347 (9th Cir. 1987).
See id. at 1345-50.
Id. at 1346-47.
Id. at 1347.
Id.
Bergen, 816 F.2d at 1347.
Id.
Id. at 1347-50.
Id. at 1349.
[d.
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it affects recovery for loss of support under DORSA. 30l In addressing the issue, the trial court had made a specific finding
of fact that the quadriplegic mother and totally disabled father
of one of the deceased seamen were entitled to the pecuniary
value of the seaman's lost support. 302 The parents of the other seamen were denied recovery for loss of support, because
the Ninth Circuit deemed the evidence on the record insufficient to prove parental dependency.303. With regard to loss of
society, the court commented in dicta, "[w]e recognize the parents tragic loss of love and companionship from their deceased
children. But loss of society is non-pecuniary and therefore not
recoverable. "304
In 1993, the Ninth Circuit decided Smith v. Trinidad
Corp.305 Smith involved a claim for loss of society brought by
the wife of a Jones Act seaman. 306 The Smith court held that
wives of injured seamen could not recover for non-pecuniary
loss under the Jones Act or general maritime law. 307 The
court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the shipowner
noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Miles changed the
law which previously allowed beneficiaries of seamen to recover for loss of society in unseaworthiness claims brought under
general maritime law. 30s The Ninth Circuit stated that "[t]he
Supreme Court in Miles . .. precluded actions for loss of society under the Jones Act, ... and [under] general admiralty
law.,,309 The court also noted that it was following the Fifth
Circuit which had recently held that previous cases allowing
loss of society to seamen's wives under general maritime law

301. Bergen, 816 F.2d at 1350-51.
302. [d. at 1350.
303. 1d.; but cf. Earles 11, 26 F.3d at 914-17 (unconditionally extending recovery
for loss of society to the parents of non-seamen under maritime law). See infra
notes on 534-43 and accompanying text for a discussion on factors admiralty
courts might consider in determining whether a beneficiary could recover for loss
of society.
304. Bergen, 816 F.2d at 1350.
305. 992 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the wife of an injured seaman
could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime law).
306. Smith v. Trinidad Corp., 992 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1993).
307. [d. There is no distinction between fatal and non-fatal i~uries when
awarding loss of society damages under general maritime law. Cater v. Placid Oil,
760 F. Supp. 568, 571 (E.D. La. 1991).
308. Smith, 992 F.2d at 996.
309. [d.
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were overruled by Miles. 310 The court concluded, "[w]e agree
with the Fifth Circuit's [broad] reading of Miles and affirm
summary judgment."311
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Smith, in accord with Kline
v. Maritrans CP, Inc.,312 decided within the Third Circuit, illustrates the state of the law, post-Miles, regarding seamen's
recovery for loss of society.313 Against this background the
Ninth Circuit considered Earles II in the non-seaman context,
splitting from the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits as to
whether, if loss of society damages are allowed, recovery may
be extended to non-dependent parents of non-seamen consistent with both special solicitude and uniformity.314
3.

The First, Second, Third and Sixth Circuits: Reconciling
the Aims of Uniformity and Special Solicitude

The doctrinal analysis of the First, Second, Third, and
Sixth Circuits are similar in that they focus on the status of
the decedent as a seaman or non-seaman, and apply both the
doctrine of uniformity and special solicitude, ensuring that
remedies available to the beneficiaries of seamen are either
uniform or not less than those allowed to the beneficiaries of
non-seamen. Moreover, when deciding whether to award loss of
society, these circuits look to the general maritime law and
decline to distinguish between seamen and non-seamen cases,
thereby adhering to a dependency rule.

310. Id.
311. Id.
312. 791 F. Supp. 455 (D. Del. 1992); see infra notes 324-29 and accompanying
text for a discussion on Kline.
313. See Smith, 992 F.2d at 996; see also Kline v. Maritrans CP, Inc., 791 F.
Supp. 455, 462 (D. Del. 1992). See generally, Miles, 498 U.S. at 33 (holding that
beneficiaries of seaman can not recover for loss of society).
314. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915-17; see supra notes 10, 136-37 and accompanying text for a discussion on the split among circuits.
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Seamen

Since the Supreme Court decided Gaudet, applying the
humanitarian policy of general maritime law to introduce loss
of society damages into admiralty, the Court has decided Miles,
re-affirming the need for admiralty uniformity.315 In the same
year the Supreme Court decided Miles, a district court within
the First Circuit considered Rollins v. Peterson Builders,
Inc. 316 The court in Rollins, like the Ninth Circuit in Earles
II, declined to follow the Fifth Circuit's financial dependency
rule, and thus sought to extend loss of society to the non-dependent IPother of a woman317 killed by electrocution while
working as a crewmember aboard an academic· research vessel. 318 First, the court looked to the language of the Supreme
Court's decisions in Moragne and Gaudet to determine that the
defendants' reliance on the word "dependent" did not evince
the Supreme Court's intention to preclude non-dependents
from recovering loss of society, especially in light of the broad
nature of the damages and the principle of special solicitude. 319 The court then considered Miles v. Melrose which had
not yet been affirmed by the Supreme Court and concluded
that, because at that time, loss of society was allowed to the
spouse of a deceased seaman, it would be consistent with the
principle of special solicitude to extend the same remedy to the
non-dependent parent of a deceased seaman who died without
a spouse. 320 Notwithstanding its comprehensive analysis, the
Rollins court was ultimately compelled to grant the
defendant's motion in limine to strike the plaintiffs claim for
loss of society when the Supreme Court decided Miles v. Apex
Marine Corp.321

315. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 587-91; Miles, 498 U.S. at 26-27 (noting that admiralty courts that "supplement" statutory remedies in maritime wrongful death actions
must do so to achieve uniform vindication of national policy).
316. 761 F. Supp. 918 (D.R.I. 1990).
317. The decedent was considered a "seaman" under the Jones Act. Rollins v.
Peterson Builders, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 918, 920 (D.R.I. 1990). See supra note 5 and
accompanying text for a discussion on seaman status.
318. Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 922-24.
319. Id. at 922-23. Cf Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17.
320. Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 923-24. Cf Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17, 917 n.18.
321. Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 929.
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Although loss of society was denied in Rollins, the case is
significant to the background of the dependency issue, because
it illustrates the minority approach ultimately utilized by the
Ninth Circuit in Earles II.322 Moreover, when the denial of
loss of society damages compelled by the seaman status of the
decedent in Rollins is contrasted with the substantial awards
for loss of society in Earles II, the anomaly shaped by the
Ninth Circuit between seamen's recovery· and non-seamen's
recovery is accentuated. 323
In Kline v. Maritrans CP, Inc.,324 the District Court of
Delaware, citing Miles, held that the non-dependent beneficiaries of a deceased seaman could not recover loss of society
damages. 325 The court denied recovery to the parents of a
twenty-eight year old Tugboat Mate who drowned after he
slipped on ice and fell overboard while his vessel was moored
in Fall River, Massachusetts. 326 The court cited the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Bergen v. FIV St. Patrick,327 a DORSA
case, for the proposition that to recover any damages under the
general maritime law, parents of a seaman must show de pendency.328 Kline illustrates Miles' effect on the elements of
damages allowed to beneficiaries of seamen, and represents the
state of the law, post-Miles, regarding seamen's recovery for
322. See Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 921-24; Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17. The
Ninth Circuit in Earles II misrepresented the ultimate holding in Rollins, which
denied non-dependent parents of a seaman standing to recover loss of society under general maritime law by citing it for the proposition that loss of society could
be awarded to the beneficiaries of non-seamen regardless of dependency. See Earles
II, 26 F.3d at 917 n.18. An accurate reading of Rollins reveals the district court's
rationale for attempting to extend recovery for loss of society to the non-dependent
mother was that:
Gaudet . . . already determined that . . . [special] solicitude warrants an award of loss of society damages to a
spouse of a seaman who is . . . killed. It is a small step
indeed to find that the same solicitude should extend to
the parents of a deceased seaman. . . .
Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 924 (emphasis added); see also KIPLING, supra note 1, at
216.
323. See Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 923-24; Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17; see also
infra notes 450-61 for a comparison of Rollins with Earles II.
324. 791 F. Supp. 455 (D. Del. 1992).
325. Kline v. Maritrans CP, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 455, 461 (D. Del. 1992).
326. 1d. at 457.
327. 816 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1987); see supra notes 290-304 and accompanying
text for a discussion on Bergen.
328. See Kline, 791 F. Supp. 462.
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wrongful death. 329
b.

Non-Seamen

In 1963, the Second Circuit decided Igneri u. Compagnie de
Transports Oceaniques,330 a longshoreman case which, in the
context of personal injury rather than wrongful death, involved
the precise issue presented to the Supreme Court ten years
later in Gaudet. 33l The court in Igneri held that the wife of a
longshoreman injured in New York territorial waters could not
recover for loss of society.332 After identifying the issue as one
of first impression, the court determined that the common law
was inconclusive, and thus looked to maritime law. 333 First,
Judge Friendly noted that Congress did not authorize recovery
for loss of society in a seaman's claim under the Jones Act. 334
The court then reasoned it could not create an anomaly nor
discriminate against seamen by putting maritime shore
workers' wives in a better position than seamen's wives. 335
The court announced, "[w]e can think of no reason why Congress, having ruled out a maritime claim ... for loss of [society] by the spouse of a negligently injured seaman, would wish
the courts to construct one for the spouse of a negligently injured [longshoreman] ."336
Estate of Fajardo u. Maersk Line Agency 337 confirmed the
basic methodology used by the Second Circuit in Igneri when
deciding whether to award recovery for loss of society in general maritime law tort actions despite the intervening rule of

329. Kline, 791 F. Supp. at 461; see Miles, 498 U.S. at 33.
330. 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964).
331. Igneri v. Compagnie de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 267 (2d Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964).
332. Id. There is no distinction between fatal and non-fatal injuries when
awarding loss of society damages under general maritime law. Cater v. Placid Oil,
760 F. Supp. 568, 571 (E.D. La. 1991).
333. Igneri, 323 F.2d at 258-59.
334. Id. at 266.
335. Id. at 267.
336. Id.
337. 1989 A.M.C. 1923 (D. Md. 1988) (not otherwise reported). See Timothy R.
Lord, Drowning In Unoccupied Waters: Estate of Fajardo v. Maersk Line Agency,
15 TvL. MAR. L.J. 423 (1991).
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Gaudet which allowed loss of society damages. 338 Significantly, the court in Fajardo declined to distinguish between seamen and non-seamen cases when deciding whether to award
loss of society to the non-dependent parents of a minor339 who
drowned in Chesapeake Bay due to large swells created from
the wake of defendant's passing container ship.340 Since neither DORSA nor the Jones Act otherwise applied, the court
first looked to maritime case law for guidance, as the Second
Circuit had done in Igneri. 341 In doing so, the court relied on
the Fifth Circuit's decisions in Sistrunk v. Circle Bar Drilling342 and Truehart v. Blandon 343 for the proposition that,
post-Gaudet, the state of maritime wrongful death favored
awarding loss of society to a decedent's dependent beneficiaries. 344 Next, the court noted the Supreme Court's instruction
to lower courts to look to the federal maritime statutes when
awarding damages under general maritime law. 345 The court
quoted Higginbotham, "DORSA should be the courts' primary
guide as they refine the non-statutory death remedy, ... because of the interest in uniformity... ."346 Therefore, although the maritime statutory scheme did not apply, the court
looked to it for guidance concluding that, because neither
DOHSA nor the Jones Act permitted recovery of loss of society
awards by non-dependent parents, neither did the general
maritime law. 347

In Anderson v. Whittiker Corp.,348 the Sixth Circuit con338. See Estate of Fajardo v. Maersk Line Agency, 1989 A.M.C. 1923, 1926-28
(D. Md. 1988) (not otherwise reported).
339. The decedent was a non-seaman. See id.
340. [d. at 1924, 1927.
341. [d. at 1926.
342. 770 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the non-dependent parents of
two seamen killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages
under general maritime law), reh'g denied, 775 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986); see supra notes 149-59 and accompanying text for a
discussion on Sistrunk.
343. 672 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. La 1987) (holding that the non-dependent family
members of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of
society damages under general maritime law); see supra notes 168-83 and accompanying text for a discussion on Truehart.
344. Fajardo, 1989 A.M.C. at 1926 (emphasis added).
345. [d.
346. [d. (quoting Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 624).
347. See id. at 1927.
348. 894 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the non-dependent parents of
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sidered a situation where four men died when a boat they were
shuttling across Lake Michigan was swamped. 349 After determining that the decedents were non-seamen, the district court
ruled that the widows and children of two of the decedents
were entitled to loss of society.35o However, the court denied
identical claims by the non-dependent parents of the other two
victims. 351 The Sixth Circuit affirmed noting that the district
court's decision relied on the "twin aims" of maritime law,
"achieving uniformity in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction
and. . . providing special solicitude to seamen. ,,362 The Sixth
Circuit reasoned that the pecuniary limitation on damages
under the Jones Act and DORSA led to the conclusion that to
deny loss of society would provide more uniformity to admiralty jurisdiction.353 Furthermore, the court emphasized that
since non-dependent parents could not recover loss of society
under either of the federal wrongful death statutes, and the
decedents were non-seamen, its decision did not hinder the
aim of providing special solicitude. 354 Therefore, the Sixth
Circuit's decision was in accord with the district court's holding
in Fajardo. 355 Anderson followed the Fifth Circuit's holding in
Miles v. Melrose,366 as well as the Supreme Court's decisions
in Moragne and Gaudet, to advance dependency as the critical
factor in determining whether to award loss of society damages. 357

non·seamen killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages
under general maritime law), affg, 692 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich 1988); but see
Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916 n.14.
349. Anderson v. Whittaker Corp., 894 F.2d 804, 806·07 (6th Cir. 1990).
350. Id. at 807.
351. 1d.
352. Id. at 811.
353. Id.
354. Anderson, 894 F.2d at 811; but see Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915 (reasoning
that parents were DOHSA beneficiaries regardless of dependency).
355. See Anderson, 894 F.2d at 811; Fajardo, 1989 A.M.C. at 1924-28.
356. 882 F.2d 976, 989 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the non·dependent parent
of a seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages
under general maritime law), affd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S.
19 (1990).
357. Anderson, 894 F.2d at 811-12.
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Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd.,3sS represents
the present view of the Second Circuit which is in accord with
the clear majority of courts on the loss of society dependency
issue in the post-Miles era. 359 In Wahlstrom, the parents of a
seventeen year old boy, killed when the jet ski he was operating collided with a power boat on the Themes River in Connecticut, brought a general maritime wrongful death claim
against the jet ski's manufacturer. 36o The Second Circuit held
that the non-dependent parents of a non-seaman killed in
territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages. 361
The Second Circuit reviewed the background of maritime
wrongful death recovery and noted that no Supreme Court case
supported non-dependent beneficiaries recovering loss of society, and neither did DOHSA nor the Jones Act when they
applied. 362 Recognizing, however, that the federal maritime
wrongful death statutes did not apply, the court looked to
federal court precedent on the issue and found, "the overwhelming majority of the pertinent federal decisions [hold]
that nondependent parents cannot recover damages for loss of
society in a general maritime [wrongful death] action. "363
In Wahlstrom, the Second Circuit squarely addressed its
policy for awarding non-pecuniary damages based on financial
dependency, justifying the dependency rule by using three
species of uniformity.364 Prior to affirming its adherence to a
dependency rule, however, the court; dismissed a principal
argument against their policy.365 The court noted that some
other courts did not impose a dependency requirement when
deciding whether to award non-pecuniary damages, such as

358. 4 F.3d 1084 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the non·dependent parents of a
non·seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages
under general maritime law), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1060 (1994); but see Earles
II, 26 F.3d at 916 n.14.
359. Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1091·93 (2d Cir.
1993); see also Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., No. 93·7490, 1994 WL
685690, at *3·4 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1994); Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on De·
cember 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804, 828·30 (2d Cir. 1994).
360. Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1086.
361. [d. at 1093.
362. [d. at 1091.
363. [d. at 1092.
364. [d. at 1092·93.
365. Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1092.
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loss of society, because dependency is a pecuniary standard,
and that therefore, the logical foundation of such a policy was
too irrational to be the basis of an inflexible rule. 366 The court
however continued, "[c]ountervailing concerns nevertheless
outweigh the force of this contention."367 The Second Circuit's
first policy concern was that uniformity among admiralty
courts prevai1. 368 The court announced that "[i]t would hardly
promote the uniform administration of admiralty actions for
this circuit to adopt a rule in conflict with almost every decided
federal case on this issue.,,369 Second, the court reasoned that
in the interest of uniformity between remedies for seamen and
non-seamen, loss of society damages could not be extended to
the non-dependent parents of a non-seaman, because the Supreme Court in Miles denied such recovery to the parents of
seamen, the "wards of admiralty," who therefore are entitled to
admiralty's greatest recovery.370 Third, the court sought uniformity with Supreme Court precedent noting that extending
the rule of Gaudet to the non-dependent parents of non-seamen
killed in territorial waters would be inconsistent with
Miles. 371 The court reasoned that because Gaudet was limited
to its facts in Miles, thereby restricting loss of society to longshoremen in territorial waters, Supreme Court precedent evidenced a trend toward restricting loss of society as an element
of damages in maritime cases.372 Thus, the clear trend within
the Second, as well as the Third and Sixth Circuits, is to
award loss of society damages to the parents of non-seamen
when not precluded by statute (i.e., in territorial waters), but

366. [d.; see also Zicherman, 1994 WL 685690, at "'3 (noting that "[nlo doubt [a
dependencyl rule denies recovery to some deserving parties; non·dependent survivors may feel the loss of a loved one as keenly as dependent survivors"); Randall
v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888, 903 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that, "[iln our
view, the law of this circuit does not unequivocally limit recovery of loss of society
damages for the wrongful death of a parent to children who are financially dependent on the decedent"); but cf. Walker v. Braus, 862 F. Supp. 527, 535 (E.D. La.
1994) (recognizing that by concluding loss of society damages are not allowed in a
general maritime wrongful death action, "implies that the dependency requirement
for recovering loss of society damages under general maritime law is no longer
viable"), remand before decision, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993).
367. Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1092; but see Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17.
368. Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1092.
369. [d.; but see Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17.
370. See Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1092.
371. [d.
372. [d. at 1092-93.
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only when there is a showing of financial dependency. Against
this background, the Ninth Circuit published Earles II.373
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Sutton v. Earles 374 ("Earles Ir) the Ninth Circuit emphasized that it was not constrained by the Jones Act or
DOHSA, nor compelled by the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,375 to impose restrictions on
general maritime law death remedies sought on behalf of nonseamen who perish within territorial waters.376 The court expressly asserted that Miles did not control. 377 Further, the
court disagreed with the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits'
broad interpretations of the uniformity rationale of Miles. 378
Thus, finding itself free to disregard the uniformity component
of Miles, the court exercised its own expansive role in developing maritime law, and consistent with its power to fashion
liberal remedies in admiralty, extended recovery for loss of
society to the non-dependent parents of non-seamen. 379
In awarding damages, the Ninth Circuit had to transit a
mine field of guiding admiralty law principles. 380 The court
exposed the fact that distinctions that make recovery in maritime wrongful death actions anomalous.381 As a result, the

373. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915-17.
374. Sutton v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1994), remand before
appeal, Earles v. United States ("Earles 1"), 935 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1991).
375. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
376. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915, 917.
377. See id. at 917.
378. ld. at 916-17; see also Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 536-37 (E.D. La.
1994) (declining to follow Earles ll), remand before decision, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.
1993).
379. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917.
380. See id. at 914-17. Among the principles the court dealt with were: uniformity, special solicitude, and dependency. See id. Dependency is a consideration,
because, as two prominent commentators in the field have noted, "since pecuniary
loss to the beneficiary is the basis for recovery [under the remedial maritime statutes] the dependency idea cannot be lost sight of." GRANT GILMORE AND CHARLES
L. BLACK, JR., THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY, § 6-30, at 361-62 n.174 (2d ed. 1975).
381. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17. Factors that may effect anomalous recovery are: (1) situs of the casualty, territorial waters versus high seas; (2) status of
the decedent, seaman versus non-seaman; and (3) status of the beneficiary, dependent versus non-dependent. See id.
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Ninth Circuit illustrated the circumstance that as remedies
develop in general maritime law, antiquated statutory constraints on damages for beneficiaries of seamen become increasingly more unjust, thus highlighting the need for legislative relief. 382
A.

GENERAL MARITIME WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS ALLOW
AWARDS FOR Loss OF SOCIETY

In Earles II, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis of damages by summarizing the history of wrongful death in maritime jurisprudence.383 After noting examples of judicially
sanctioned non-uniform recovery throughout the history of
maritime wrongful death law, the Ninth Circuit agreed with
the appellees' argument that Gaudet had already decided the
precise question presented, and asserted that Gaudet controlled its decision. 384 Therefore, the court concluded, loss of
society is authorized when, as in Gaudet, a non-seaman is
killed in territorial waters.385 The court reasoned that, although both DOHSA and the Jones Act limit damages to pecuniary loss for maritime wrongful deaths, DOHSA did not apply
because the deaths took place in territorial waters, and the
Jones Act did not apply because the decedents were not seamen. 386 The court distinguished both Higginbotham and
Miles by the fact that the remedial maritime statutory scheme
applied in those cases, whereas in Earles II, it did not. 387
Therefore, the court reasoned that it must follow the general
maritime rule which, under Gaudet, allowed loss of society
damages. 388 The Ninth Circuit thus concluded that the beneficiaries of non-seamen killed in territorial waters could recover loss of society as an element of damages in a general mari-

382. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917; see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
383. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-15; see supra notes 68-148 and accompanying text
for a discussion on the history of maritime wrongful death jurisprudence.
384. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915; see also Opening brief for Appellee at 37, Sutton
v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 92-55548).
385. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915 (emphasis added).
386. ld.
387. ld. In Higginbotham, DORSA applied because the death occurred on the
high seas, while in Miles, the Jones Act applied because the decedent was a seaman.ld.
388. See id.
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time wrongful death action. 3s9

B. Loss OF SOCIETY AWARDS Do NOT REQUIRE DEPENDENCY
1.

General Maritime Law Allows Parents to Recover for
Wrongful Death Regardless of Dependency

The Ninth Circuit reviewed the trial court's finding that
the parents of non-seamen were entitled to loss of society without proving they were financially dependent upon the decedents. 39o The court framed the issue as one of standing. 391
The court looked to DORSA and the Jones Act for guidance as
to who has standing to recover damages when a non-seaman
perishes within territorial waters.392 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that parents had standing to recover damages under the
Jones Act, regardless of dependency, when, as in Earles II,
there is no surviving spouse or child. 393 The Ninth Circuit
then agreed with the Second Circuit's reasoning in Wahlstrom
v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus. Ltd.,394 which used DORSA's
schedule of beneficiaries, which includes a "wife, husband,
parent, child or dependent relative," to reject dependency as
the critical factor.395 The court reasoned that, since Gaudet
instructs that loss of society damages are allowed in a Moragne
action when the Jones Act and DORSA do not apply, and federal courts generally look to DORSA's schedule of beneficiaries
when deciding who has standing to recover damages in a
Moragne action, the parents were entitled to loss of society as
an element of damages regardless of dependency.396

389. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915.
390. Id. at 915-17.
391. Id. at 915.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. 4 F.3d 1084 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the non-dependent parents of a
non-seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages
under general maritime law), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1060 (1994).
395. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916 (emphasis added); see also 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 76168 (1988); Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1090-91 (2d
Cir. 1993).
396. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916; but see infra notes 534-43 and accompanying
text for a discussion on factors admiralty courts might consider in determining
whether a beneficiary could recover for 108s of society.
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Dependency Is Not a Factor When Awarding Loss of
Society Damages in a General Maritime Wrongful Death
Action

The government relied on a dependency rule, arguing: (1)
that in Higginbotham, the Supreme Court dared litigants to
challenge the propriety of loss of society damages in the future
if they became "a substantial part of the survivor's recovery,"397 (2) that a broad reading of the uniformity rationale
expressed by the Court in both Higginbotham and Miles that
asserted recovery should be uniform between the federal statutes and Moragne actions was required, and (3) for adherence
to the language of Miles which dictates that lower courts look
to the Jones Act and DOHSA for policy guidance. 39B The
Ninth Circuit noted that Higginbotham sanctioned non-uniform recovery of damages between territorial waters cases and
high seas cases in order to comply with DOHSA's limitation to
pecuniary damages. 399 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the
government's claim that post-Miles, courts must look to both
the Jones Act and DOHSA for policy guidance, and likewise
deny loss of society damages to non-dependents. 4oo Indeed,
the Ninth Circuit challenged the government's reliance on a
dependency rule explaining that the dependency policy was
derived from dicta in Higginbotham and Miles. 401

397. In Earles II, loss of society damages were a substantial part of the
parents' recovery. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. See generally W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 127, at 952 n.81 (5th ed.
1984) (noting that the Supreme Court's dicta in Higginbotham, whether awards for
loss of society must be primarily symbolic rather than a substantial portion of
recovery, has not yet been decided).
398. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915·16. Both statutes limit recovery to pecuniary
damages. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988); 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761·68 (1988).
399. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915·16; see also Opening brief for Appellant at 40·45,
Earles II (No. 92·55548).
400. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915·16.
401. ld. at 915·16.
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Uniformity of Recovery in a General Maritime Wrongful
Death Action is Not Compelled by Supreme Court
Jurisprudence Unless Damages are Otherwise Controlled
by Statute

The Ninth Circuit synthesized the Supreme Court's reasoning under Gaudet-Higginbotham-Miles, deriving the rule
that uniformity of recovery was a factor in a Moragne action
only if the damages awarded conflicted directly with either of
the federal maritime wrongful death statutes. 402 The court
noted, "the results in Higginbotham and Miles were clearly
dictated by statute, and neither statute limits the damages
recoverable for death in territorial waters that were authorized
by Gaudet."403 Thus, the court's reasoning suggests that when
the federal maritime statutory scheme does not apply, the
maritime case law that interprets it does not either. 404 By
reasoning that both Higginbotham and Miles were dictated by
statute, the Ninth Circuit dismissed those holdings' emphasis
on uniformity, thereby making headway toward the conclusion
in Earles II that loss of society damages could be awarded
regardless of dependency. 405
4.

Uniformity and Special Solicitude Do Not Preclude NonSeamen's Beneficiaries from Recovering Damages Denied to
Beneficiaries of Seamen

The Ninth Circuit addressed the assertion that the court
should adopt the government's approach because it is the same
approach to loss of society used by the Second, Fifth, and Sixth

402. [d. at 916 (emphasis added).
403. [d.
404. See id.; but see Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1990)
(noting that admiralty courts that "supplement" statutory remedies in maritime
wrongful death actions must do so to achieve uniform vindication of national policy); Mobil Oil v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978) (noting that since Congress has never enacted a comprehensive maritime code, courts that award maritime wrongful death damages must do so in a way that preserves the uniformity
of maritime law); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 397-409 (1970)
(noting that when awarding non-statutory remedies, the courts should look to
DOHSA and the Jones Act for guidance).
405. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916-17.
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Circuits. 406 The court disagreed with the Second Circuit's
holding in Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., which
declined to award loss of society damages to the non-dependent
parents of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters. 407 The
Ninth Circuit explained that the Second Circuit's reasoning in
. Wahlstrom was in the interest of uniformity between recovery
for the deaths of seamen and non-seamen in territorial waters. 408 The court noted that the Second Circuit had considered the interest of special solicitude to seamen by reasoning
that the recovery allowed to beneficiaries of non-seamen should
not be more generous than the recovery allowed to seamen's
beneficiaries which is limited.to pecuniary loss under the Jones
Act, and therefore precludes loss of society damages. 409
The Ninth Circuit declared itself free from the guiding
principle of uniformity that the Second Circuit had found compelling in Wahlstrom, because, unlike the Second Circuit, the
Ninth Circuit found that Miles did not contro1. 410 The court
reiterated that, because the facts of Miles involved a seaman,
the Court in Miles .was constrained to limit damages under the
Jones Act, whereas the court in Earles II, dealing with nonseamen, was free to fashion its own remedy, even if inconsistent with the remedial statutes.41l It bolstered this assertion
by pointing out that the Supreme Court created inconsistent
recovery for death of non-seamen between territorial waters
and the high seas by its holdings in Gaudet and
Higginbotham. 412 Thus, because the decedents in Earles II
were non-seamen, the principle of statutory uniformity as
applied in the seaman context under Miles was not a compelling factor in the court's analysis. 413

406. Id. at 916; Opening brief for Appellant at 40-45, Earles II (No. 92-55548).
407. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916; see also Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 53637 (E.D. La. 1994) (declining to follow Earles 11), remand before decision, 995 F.2d
77 (5th Cir. 1993); see supra notes 10, 358-73 and accompanying text for a discussion on Wahlstrom.
408. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916-17.
409. Id. The Ninth Circuit clarified that the Second Circuit's decision in
Wahlstrom was based on the Wahlstrom court's expansive interpretation of the
uniformity principle that the Supreme Court declared in Miles. Id. at 917.
410. Id.
411. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917.
412. Id.
413. See id. at 915-17.
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The "Humane and Liberal Character of Proceedings in
Admiralty" Justify Extending Loss Of Society Damages to
Non-Dependent Beneficiaries of Non-Seamen

The Ninth Circuit declined to interpret the law as drawing
any distinction between dependents and non-dependents for
the purpose of awarding loss of society in a Moragne action for
death of non-seamen in territorial waters. 414 The court noted,
"it better becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy,
when not required to withhold it by established and inflexible
rules.,,415 Implicit in the court's reasoning was recognition of
its own special role in the evolution of maritime jurisprudence
as not merely supplemental, but appointed with the power to
develop substantive rules. 416 Therefore, although it was a
matter of first impression for the Ninth Circuit, the court
found that because the issue was not directly preempted by
statute, extending loss of society to non-dependents was consistent with its authority to fashion liberal remedies in the general maritime law. 417 Moreover, the court concluded that any
lack of uniformity created by Earles II was the result of the
clash between Congress' statutory enactments under the Jones
Act and DORSA, and the Supreme Court's rules of decision in
Moragne and Gaudet. 418
V. CRITIQUE
In Earles II, the Ninth Circuit held that the beneficiaries
of non-seamen killed in territorial waters may recover loss of
society damages regardless of dependency.419 The Supreme
Court has ruled that beneficiaries of Jones Act seamen cannot
recover loss of society damages. 42o The Earles II decision cre414. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917.
415. Id. (quoting The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (C.C.D. Md. 1865».
416. See id.; see also In re Oswego Barge Corp., 644 F.2d 327, 335-36 (2d Cir.
1981) (noting that the Supreme Court has approved the creation of new rights
pursuant to federal court-made maritime law more forcefully than in other areas
of federal court-made law), reh'g denied, 673 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1982).
417. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917.
418. Id.
419. Sutton v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903, 920 (9th Cir. 1994), remand
before appeal, Earles v. United States ("Earles I"), 935 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1991).
420. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990) (holding that the parent of
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ated anomalous recovery within the Ninth Circuit and a split
between the Ninth Circuit and the other circuits.421 The
Ninth Circuit's holding, therefore, is at odds with the spirit of
maritime uniformity.422 More disturbing, the rule is in conflict with the ancient maritime principle that seamen are the
"wards of admiralty" and are therefore entitled to its most
generous protection, special solicitude. 423
Notwithstanding the misapplication of the principles of
uniformity and special solicitude, the Ninth Circuit's Earles II
decision awarded loss of society damages to beneficiaries of
non-seamen without requiring the district court to conduct a
factual analysis of 10ss.424 Whether to award loss of society in
maritime wrongful death law is a question that strikes at the
heart of a greater debate in American jurisprudence: whether

a seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages
under general maritime law).
421. See Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 536 (E.D. La. 1994), remand before
appeal, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 989
(5th Cir. 1989), affd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990)
(holding that the non-dependent parent of a seaman killed in territorial waters
could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime law); but cf.
Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17. See supra notes 14, 49-55 and accompanying text for
a discussion of uniformity.
422. See Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 536 (E.D. La. 1994), remand before
appeal, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 989
(5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the non-dependent parent of a seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime
law), affd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990); but cf. Earles
II, 26 F.3d at 914-17. See supra notes 14, 49-55 and accompanying text for a
discussion of uniformity.
423. See Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 536-38 (noting that persons that sue in admiralty are permitted no greater "solicitude" than seamen, and that by allowing nonseamen recovery for loss of society that seamen's beneficiaries are not allowed, the
Earles II court implicitly denied the driving principles behind creating a federal
maritime law cause of action for wrongful death in the first place); see also
Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1093 (2d Cir. 1993)
(holding that the non-dependent parents of non-seamen killed in territorial waters
could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime law due to considerations of uniformity), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1060 (1994); Anderson v.
Whittaker Corp., 894 F.2d 804, 811 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that by denying nondependent parents of non-seaman recovery for loss of society, the aim of special
solicitude to seamen was not unduly effected, and that the principle of uniformity
was furthered); cf. Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 987-89 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding
that the non-dependent parent of a seaman killed in territorial waters could not
recover loss of society damages under general maritime law), affd sub nom. Miles
v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 33-37 (1990).
424. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17.
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the purpose of the judicial system is to compensate tort victims
for their pecuniary loss only, or whether it is to effectuate the
public policy of awarding damages for more intangible losses. 425 Although measuring the quantum of intangible losses is
problematic, it appears that in Earles II, the Ninth Circuit was
led to include recovery for loss of society under general maritime law to anyone with standing. 426 Moreover, the broad
rule adopted in Earles II now applies to all general maritime
wrongful death cases within the Ninth Circuit.427
A.

ANOMALIES CREATED BY THE EARLES

II RULE

The Earles II damages rule leads to anomalies in maritime
recovery within the Ninth Circuit, and among recovery allowed
in other federal circuits, by allowing non-dependent beneficiaries of non-seamen to recover loss of society damages while
dependent beneficiaries of seamen are denied such recovery.428 Ironically, non-uniform recovery is precisely what led
the Supreme Court, in Moragne, to create a cause of action for
wrongful death of non-seamen killed in territorial waters. 429
Moreover, in Miles, the Supreme Court re-affirmed that basic

425. See STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND
INJURY §§ 3:1, 3:50, at 5-19, 221-39 (3rd ed. 1992).
426. See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., No. 93-7490, 1994 WL
685690, at *3-4 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1994) (remanding an award for loss of society for
a trial on the dependency issue); Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 537-38 (holding that the
beneficiaries of non-semen killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of
society consistent with the guiding principle of special solicitude to seamen); Miles
v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 33-37 (1990) (holding that the parent of a seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages under
general maritime law due to considerations of uniformity); cf. Earles II, 26 F.3d at
914-17.
427. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 920.
428. See Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1407 (9th Cir. 1994);
see also Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding, 27 F.3d 426, 426-30 (9th Cir. 1994); Walker
v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 536 (E.D. La. 1994) (noting that Miles was decided to
remedy anomalies in maritime wrongful death recovery, and that the current nonuniformity as a result of Earles 11 is analogous to one anomaly the Court found
compelling when it decided to create a general maritime law cause of action for
wrongful death in Moragne), remand before decision, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993).
429. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 395-96 (1970) (noting that
the Court's holding which recognized a general maritime wrongful death action
was compelled partly to remedy the anomaly that - contrary to settled admiralty
law tenets - Jones Act seamen were, at that time, extended less protection under
maritime law than other suitors).
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approach to maritime remedies when it counseled lower courts
not to award non-uniform damages within maritime wrongful
death actions of Jones Act seamen. 430 .
1.

Anomalous Recovery Within The Ninth Circuit

In the Ninth Circuit, the anomalous holding in Earles II
may be illustrated by Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding,431 a case
the Ninth Circuit decided the same month as Earles II. In
Earles II, the court, unconstrained by either the Jones Act or
DORSA, fashioned "humane and liberal remedies" for the
beneficiaries of non-seamen. 432 The Davis holding was significant because the court applied the uniformity component of
Miles broadly, declining to extend loss of future earnings in a
survival action brought under general· maritime law on behalf
of the estates of two deceased seamen. 433 Thus, even though
the Jones Act and DORSA did not apply, in Davis, the Ninth
Circuit refused to extend recovery to the seamen's estates;
whereas in Earles II, the court extended recovery for loss of
society to the beneficiaries of non-seamen. 434
The next case the Ninth Circuit considered regarding loss
of society damages, Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc.,435 was
decided on July 27, 1994. In Chan, the Ninth Circuit decided
the issue of whether the dependent family members of a non-

430. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 33 (1990) (noting that the
Court's holding which denied loss of society benefits to the non-dependent mother
of a seaman killed in territorial waters restored a uniform rule applicable to all
wrongful death actions available to seamen).
431. 27 F.3d 426 (9th Cir. 1994).
432. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917.
433. Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding, 27 F.3d. 426, 430 (9th Cir. 1994).
434. [d. at 430. The Jones Act did not apply in Davis, because the suit was not
against the seaman's employer, and therefore was not against a Jones Act defendant. [d.
435. 39 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994) (declining to award loss of society damages to
the dependent family members of a non-seaman injured on the high seas because
of DOHSA's denial of such recovery to the beneficiaries of those killed on the high
seas, coupled with the Supreme Court's emphasis on uniformity of damages among
maritime tort actions in Miles). It should be noted that as originally released
Chan conflicted directly with Earles II, therefore, subsequent to July 1994, Chan
was re-released to comport with Earles II. See Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc.,
1994 A.M.C. 2642 (9th Cir. 1994) (reporting the Ninth Circuit's decision in Chan
as originally released).
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seaman could recover loss of society in a personal injury
case. 4S6 The case arose in connection with the capsizing of an
inflatable raft which ferried passengers from a cruise ship to
an atoll in the South Pacific, near Tahiti. 437 Benny Chan, the
injured father of the family, suffered brain damage as a result
of the accident.43s The court held that in the interest of uniformity as emphasized in Miles, a seaman case, the family
members of a non-seaman injured on the high seas could not
recover loss of society.439
In Chan, the Ninth Circuit noted that it must "look for
guidance to congressional enactments in the field of maritime
law.,,440 The court further noted it should also be guided by
the "twin aims" of maritime law, uniformity and special solicitude. 441 The court announced that because the accident took
place on the high seas, the remedial provisions of DOHSA were
instructive, and that DOHSA did not allow non-pecuniary
damages. 442 In Chan, however, DOSHA did not apply because
the victim was injured rather than killed. 443 Likewise, since
the accident in Earles II had taken place in territorial waters,
rather than on the high seas, DOHSA did not apply in that
case either.444 Nevertheless, in Earles II, the Ninth Circuit
extended recovery because DOHSA did not apply, while in
Chan, the court declined to award loss of society damages even
though DOHSA did not apply.445
In concluding that loss of society was not allowed in Chan,
a non-seaman case, the Ninth Circuit sought to serve the goal
of uniformity of damages in maritime cases that the Supreme

436. Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1994).
There is no distinction between fatal and non-fatal ir\iuries when awarding loss of
society damages under general maritime law. Cater v. Placid Oil, 760 F. Supp.
568, 571 (E.D. La. 1991).
437. Chan, 39 F.3d at 1401-02.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 1408.
440. Id. at 1407.
441. Id.
442. Chan, 39 F.3d at 1407.
443. [d.
444. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915.
445. Chan, 39 F.3d at 1408; but see Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917.
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Court emphasized in Miles, a seaman case. 446 However, faced
with an analogous decision in Earles II, the Ninth Circuit deemphasized the uniformity component of Miles, because Miles
was a seaman's case, while Earles II, involved non-seamen. 447
Yet, as in Earles II, the accident in Chan also involved nonseamen. 448 Thus, it is anomalous that in both cases neither
the Jones Act nor DOHSA applied, yet, in Earles II, the Ninth
Circuit awarded loss of society damages, while one month
later, in Chan, the court denied such recovery.449

2.

Split Circuits

The circuits are split over when, or whether, federal courts
can award loss of society damages in a maritime wrongful
death action. 450 The unfair treatment of Jones Act seaman in
the Earles II decision is accentuated when contrasted with the
First Circuit case, Rollins v. Peterson Builders, Inc. 451 In
Rollins, the strong bond between the decedent-seaman and her
beneficiary-mother had been painstakingly demonstrated to
the court, whereas in Earles II there was little evidence of
mutually supportive relationships between the five decedents
and their parents. 452 When not "shipping-out," the decedent
in Rollins lived at home. 453 At least two of the decedents in
Earles II did not live with their parents, and as to the other
three, no evidence of common residency was established. 454
Furthermore, with regard to one of the decedent's in Earles II,
the record established that he had no contact with his nondependent father-beneficiary for several years prior to his

446. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 908; Miles, 498 U.S. at 32·33.
447. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17; Miles, 498 U.S. at 32-33.
448. Chan, 39 F.3d at 1401-02; Earles II, 26 F.3d at 908.
449. See Chan, 39 F.3d at ·1407-08; but cf. Emery v. Rock Island Boatworks,
Inc., 847 F. Supp. 114, 116-18 (E.D. lll. 1994) (holding that the spouse of a nonseaman injured in state waters could recover loss of society damages because neither the Jones Act nor DORSA precluded or limited damages).
450. See supra notes 10, 136-37 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
split among circuits.
451. Rollins v. Peterson Builders, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 918 (D.R.I. 1990).
452. See Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 920; Earles v. United States ("Earles I"), 935
F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1991).
453. Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 920.
454. See Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Appellant at 1520, Earles II (No. 92-55548).
-
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death, and he contributed no support whatsoever to his beneficiary-mother.455 Finally, the tragic electrocution of the decedent in Rollins occurred within the course and scope of her
employment as a seaman, while the accident in Earles II resulted in part from a night of heavy drinking and the criminal
negligence of one of the plaintiffs. 456 Moreover, the accident
in Rollins happened while the decedent's mother had just
boarded the research vessel in order to greet her daughter
after an extended sea voyage. 457
Arguably, when maritime rules are replaced, by factors
that the majority of state and federal courts apply when determining whether to award loss of society damages,45S and
those factors are applied to the facts of RolliTJ,s and Earles II, it
appears that recovery in Rollins was more justified than in
Earles II.459 Yet, in Earles II substantial recovery for loss of
society was awarded, while in Rollins, recovery for loss of society was denied because of outmoded and inflexible maritime
statutory constraints coupled with the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Miles. 460 Essentially, recovery was denied in
Rollins, because the decedent was a seaman. 461

455. See Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Appellant at 20,
Earles II (No. 92-55548).
456. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text for a discussion on the facts
of Earles II.
457. Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 920.
458. See infra note 535 for a list of factors admiralty courts might consider in
determining whether a beneficiary could recover for loss of society.
459. See Sutton v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903, 917 n.18 (9th Cir. 1994);
Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 929.
460. See Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 929; supra note 33 and accompanying text for
the amount of loss of society damages awarded in Earles 11.
461. See Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 929. The Ninth Circuit in Earles II misrepresented the ultimate holding in Rollins, which denied non-dependent parents of a
seaman standing to recover loss of society under general maritime law, by citing it
for the proposition that loss of society could be awarded to beneficiaries of nonseamen regardless of dependency. See Earles 11, 26 F.3d at 917 n.18. An accurate
reading of Rollins reveals the district court's rationale for attempting to extend
recovery for loss of society to the non-dependent mother was that:
Gaudet . . . already determined that . . . [special) solicitude warrants an award of loss of society damages to a
spouse of a seaman who is . . . killed. It is a small step
indeed to find that the same solicitude should extend to
the parents of a deceased seaman. . . .
Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 924 (emphasis added); see KIPLING, supra 'note I, at 216.
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Fifth Circuit

A district court deciding a case on remand from the Fifth
Circuit has directly criticized the decision in Earles II.402 In
Walker v. Braus403 the court declined to follow Earles II, because the court reasoned that the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Earles II was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision
in Miles. 464 The court explained that Earles II created nonuniform recovery, within the Ninth Circuit, based on status of
the decedent.465 The Walker Court cited Smith v. Trinidad
Corp. as an example of such non-uniformity, because the Ninth
Circuit, just one year prior to Earles II, held that the uniformity requirement of Miles compelled the conclusion that the
spouse of an injured seaman could not recover for loss of society under general maritime law. 466 The court continued,
"[Earles II] therefore creates an anomaly in the Ninth Circuit:
The beneficiaries of seamen - traditionally the wards of admiralty - cannot recover damages that beneficiaries of nonseamen are permitted to recover. The Supreme Court's decision
in Miles was designed to eliminate these kinds of inconsistent
results."467 With this declaration, the district court, by direction of the Fifth Circuit, aligned itself with the Second Circuit's
holding in Wahlstrom and the Sixth Circuit's holding in Anderson, declining to award loss of society damages to the nondependent beneficiaries of non-seamen killed in territorial

462. Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527 (E.n. La. 1994) (holding that the beneficiaries of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime law), remand before decision, 995 F.2d 77
(5th Cir. 1993).
463. 861 F. Supp. 527 (E.n. La. 1994), remand before decision, 995 F.2d 77 (5th
Cir. 1993).
.
464. Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 536.
465. [d.
466. [d.; see Smith v. Trinidad Corp., 992 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
the wife of an injured seaman could not recover loss of society damages under the
maritime law); see also supra notes 305-11 and accompanying text for a discussion
on Smith.
467. Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 536.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995

69

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 6

102

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:33

waters.468

b.

Second Circuit

The Second Circuit has recently re-affirmed its policy for
awarding loss of society in general maritime law when neither
DORSA nor the Jones Act apply.469 In Zicherman v. Korean
Air Lines470 and Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on December 21, 1988 {"Lockerbie"),471 the Second Circuit applied federal maritime law to the downings of two transoceanic airline
flights. 472 The court in Zicherman held that the non-dependent relative of one of the victims could not recover loss of
society damages, and remanded the award made to another
relative pending disposition of a trial on the dependency issue. 473 The court in Lockerbie held that loss of society damages were allowed to the spouse and dependent children of one of
the victims, but declined to award loss of society to the family
of another victim, because the claimants included non-dependent adult children of the decedent.474 The Second Circuit, in
both cases, cited Miles, Sistrunk, and Anderson for the proposition that general maritime law extends loss of society to no one

468. See supra notes 10, 136-37 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
split among circuits.
469. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., No. 93-7490, 1994 WL 685690, at
*3-4 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1994) (holding that federal maritime law does not allow recovery for loss of society to non-dependent family members); Air Disaster at
Lockerbie Scotland on December 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804, 828-30 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that federal maritime law does not allow recovery for loss of society to
non-dependent family members).
470. No. 93-7490, 1994 WL 685690, at *3-4 (2nd Cir. Dec. 5, 1994).
471. 37 F.3d 804, 828-30 (2nd Cir. 1994).
472. Zicherman, 1994 WL 685690, at ·3-4; Lockerbie, 37 F.3d at 828-30. American courts apply the general maritime law to the issue of damages in an international air disaster because, under the Warsaw Convention, damages are measured
according to the internal law of the party to the convention. Lockerbie, 37 F.3d at
828-30. United States District Courts apply maritime case law when holding that
a federal action for wrongful death exists under the Warsaw Convention, because
the general maritime law is one of the oldest bodies of federal judge-made law. rd.
See In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 414-15 (9th Cir
1983); see also supra note 3. Therefore, the general maritime law is the appropriate body of federal law to apply when deciding whether to include loss of society
damages under the Warsaw Convention. Lockerbie, 37 F.3d at 828-30.
473. Zicherman, 1994 WL 685690, at *3-4.
474. Lockerbie, 37 F.3d at 828-30.
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other than spouses and dependents. 476
Zicherman and Lockerbie affirm the Second Circuit's adherence to the dependency rule for awarding loss of society
damages in general maritime law despite the Ninth Circuit's
earlier decision in Earles II.476 Moreover, by remanding the
trial court's award of loss of society to one of the relatives of
the decedent for a determination on the dependency issue, the
Second Circuit demonstrated that some factual analysis of loss
must be undertaken. 477 Zicherman and Lockerbie thus add to
the proposition that dependency has developed into a principle
factor when awarding loss of society damages under the general maritime law, and illustrate the present split in the circuits
caused by the Ninth Circuit's Earles II decision. 478

B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN EARLES II IS INCONSISTENT WITH CURRENT SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON
AWARDING Loss OF SOCIETY DAMAGES IN MARITIME
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS

Arguably, the Ninth Circuit in Earles II misapplied the
Supreme Court's approach to uniform recovery under general
maritime law, as announced in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,
and misapplied the doctrine of special solicitude. 479 In Earles
II, the Ninth Circuit noted that, albeit sub silentio, the Supreme Court had sanctioned non-uniform recovery in general
maritime wrongful death actions when, in Higginbotham, the
Court foreclosed loss of society damages to the beneficiaries of

475. Zicherman, 1994 WL 685690, at *3; Lockerbie, 37 F.3d at 830. The court
in Lockerbie stated, "We find no maritime case extending loss of society damages
to plaintiffs other than spouses and dependents." Lockerbie, 37 F.3d at 830. Apparently the court was not aware of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Earles II.
476. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17; see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
477. See Zicherman, 1994 WL 685690, at *3-4; See infra notes 534-43 and accompanying text for a discussion on factors admiralty courts might consider in
determining whether a beneficiary could recover for loss of society.
478. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17.
479. See Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 31-38 (E.D. La. 1994), remand
before decision, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the beneficiaries of a
non-seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages
under general maritime law); see also Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19,
33-37 (1990) (holding that the non-dependent parent of a seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime law).
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those killed on the high seas, while not overruling Gaudet
which allowed such recovery to the beneficiaries of those killed
in territorial waters. 480 However, since the Supreme Court
ruled on the propriety of non-uniform damages in actions
brought by the beneficiaries of Jones Act seamen in Miles, the
Court has not spoken on whether the elements of damages
permitted to wrongful death beneficiaries of non-seamen may
differ from the recovery allowed to the beneficiaries of seamen. 481
1.

The Ninth Circuit Misapplied the Doctrine of Uniformity

There appears to be no good reason for requiring uniformity between elements of damages allowed to beneficiaries of
seamen and those allowed to beneficiaries of non-seamen. 482
However, if there must be non-uniform recovery, recovery
allowed to seamen's beneficiaries should not be less than that
awarded to the beneficiaries of non-seamen, because the rationale for awarding the beneficiaries of non-seamen extended
damages is at odds with uniformity of the general maritime
law, while the public policy granting seamen "special solicitude" is firmly rooted in jurisprudence and legislative enactment. 483 Although the notion of keeping the general maritime
law current with developments in the common law is both a
sound and persuasive reason for developing the law of maritime damages,484 uniformity and special solicitude tQgether
compel the conclusion that, if non-uniformity in maritime
480. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916; see Mobil Oil v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618,
622-26 (1978).
481. See supra notes 93-137 for a discussion on the Supreme Court's treatment
of the loss of society issue under general maritime law. See also infra notes 48395 for a discussion on the breadth of the constitutional doctrine of uniformity in
general.
482. Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 537-38 n.14; see supra notes I, 5, 14, 47-55, 79-82
and accompanying text for a discussion on the principles of uniformity and special
solicitude.
483. See supra notes 5, 47-48 and accompanying text for a discussion on special
solicitude.
484. It is arguable that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Earles II was not an attempt at developing the general maritime law consistent with the common law,
because it is apparently not the majority rule outside of admiralty jurisdiction to
award loss of society type damages regardless of factors tending to prove loss,
such as financial dependency. See STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., RECOVERY FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH AND INJURY §§ 3:1, :50, at 5-19, 221-39 (3d ed. 1992).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss1/6

72

Mead: Admiralty Law

ADMIRALTY LAW

1995]

105

wrongful death recovery is to be sanctioned, recovery allowed
to seamen's beneficiaries should not be less than that awarded
to the beneficiaries of non-seamen. 485
The grant of admiralty jurisdiction itself supports the
argument that uniformity between damages for seamen and
non-seamen may require that recovery for non-seamen should
not be greater than that allowed to seamen. 486 One year prior
to deciding Miles, the Supreme Court decided Sisson v. Ruby,487 the most recent case in a long line of cases clarifying
when admiralty tort jurisdiction arises for the purpose of applying the general maritime law. 488 Significant to the argument that seamen's recovery should be at least uniform with
non-seamen's recovery, the Court discussed the scope and
application of the principle of uniformity:
Although we recognized that protecting commercial shipping is at the heart of admiralty jurisdiction, we also [note] that that interest 'cannot
be adequately served if admiralty jurisdiction is
restricted to those individuals actually engaged
in commercial maritime activity. This interest
can be fully vindicated only if all operators of
vessels on navigable waters are subject to uniform rules.... The failure to recognize the
breadth of this federal interest ignores the potential effect of non-commercial maritime activity on maritime commerce. The potential disruptive impact of a collision between two boats on
navigable waters,... compels the conclusion
that [a] ... collision between two pleasure boats
on navigable waters has a significant relationship with maritime commerce. 489

Thus, it can not be ignored that the Supreme Court has recently spoken on the "breadth" of the principle of uniformity in
general, and has held that the principle of uniformity, in at

485. See Anderson, 894 F.2d at 811-12; see also Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1090-93;
Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 535; but see Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916-17.
486. See Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990).
487. 497 U.S. 358 (1990) (clarifying the test used to determine when admiralty
tort jurisdiction applies).
488. Sisson, 497 U.S. at 362.
489. ld. (emphasis in original).
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least one context, applies equally between pleasure boaters,
such as the decedents in Earles II, and commercial mariners,
such as Jones Act seamen. 490
The question presents itself: Why does the present anomaly in damages recovery exist? Although today, the Jones Act's
limitation on non-pecuniary damages appears draconian, when
Congress enacted the Jones act in 1920, the act was consistent
with the principle of "special solicitude."491 However, by
adopting the Jones Act, Congress dropped anchor on the law of
seamen.492 As a result, the law of seamen has not progressed
with more modern and liberal ideas concerning recovery.493
Thus, perhaps the best explanation for the current anomaly is
that admiralty courts, in trying to keep pace with common law
developments outside the maritime context, have incorporated
current common law developments into the general maritime
law, but are unable or unwilling to do so when constrained by
outdated statutes. 494 The Ninth Circuit's decision in Earles II
is one example of this incorporation. 495 As the court in Earles
II suggested, because the history of maritime law shows that
the courts have been ordained with great power to develop the
law, it follows that the courts need not develop the law in a
manner entirely consistent with legislative intent, but must do

490. Id.
491. The Jones Act was a progressive act when enacted as evinced by the fact
that it allowed plaintiffs a negligence action against their employer under a "pure
comparative fault" standard of liability. See The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110,
119-24 (1936); 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988). Traditional common law tort defenses,
such as assumption of the risk, were therefore not a bar to recovery under the
Jones Act. The Arizona, 298 U.S. at 119-24. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of special solicitude for seamen.
492. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 33-37 (1990) (loss of society not allowed to a
seaman's mother); cf. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17 (loss of society extended to nondependent parents of non-seamen).
493. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 33-37 (1990) (loss of society not allowed to a
seaman's mother); cf. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17 (loss of society extended to nondependent parents of non-seamen).
494. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17. One commentator has noted that, "[g)iven
the embryonic stage of seaman's rights under the general maritime law in 1920,"
the better question to ask when awarding damages is: What was Congressional
intent at that time as to incorporating future rights of recovery as they develop in
the common law? Steven G. Flynn, Punitive Damages After Haslip & Miles v.
Apex Marine: Allowable for Everyone but Seamen?, 5 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 155, 165
(1992).
495. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17.
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so in a way so as to achieve justice.496 Disturbingly, in Earles
II, this charge conflicted with the uniformity of general maritime law. 497

2.

The Ninth Circuit Misapplied the Doctrine of Special
Solicitude

The leading case advocating liberal remedies in admiralty,
The Sea Gull,498 was decided in 1865. In The Sea Gull, the
husband of a woman killed in a collision between vessels on
Chesapeake Bay filed an action seeking damages against the
SEA GULL in rem, the alleged tortious vesse1. 499 The lower
court applied the prevailing common law rule at the time, that
a cause of action dies with its possessor. 500 On appeal, Justice
Chase explained that the rule against wrongful death was a
species of common law. 501 The appeals court asserted that although the common law was generally opposed to wrongful
death claims, equity and general principles of natural law were
in favor. 502 Therefore, the court reasoned that because maritime law owes its heritage to the civil law and equity, and
because equity favors such suits, "certainly it better becomes
the humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty
to give than to withhold the remedy, when not required to
withhold it by established and inflexible rules."503
It is important to note that the policy the court advocated
in The Sea Gull is not the same cause embraced by American
maritime jurisprudence which considers seamen the "wards of
admiralty" deserving of "special solicitude" for the hazards

496. [d. at 917 (noting that, becau8e neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA otherwise applied, the Ninth Circuit did not consider itself guided by the principle of
uniformity, but rather by the humanitarian component of the general maritime
law).
497. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 33-37; see also Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 622-26;
Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1974); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.s. 375, 387-88, 397-402 (1970).
498. 21 F. Cas. 909 (C.C.D. Md. 1865) (the leading case employing broad language to advocate flexible remedies in admiralty proceedings).
499. The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909 (C.C.D. Md. 1865).
500. [d.
501. [d.
502. [d. at 910.
503. [d.
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encountered in the every day service of their employment. 504
Today however, the two notions have apparently been made
interchangeable by judicial confusion. 505 Beadle v.
Spencer506 and The Arizona,507 are two cases that stand for
the proposition that, because of the greater risks borne by
seamen, their rights to recovery have traditionally been broader than those extended to non-seamen. 508 However, these cases do not embrace the policy that all who venture on the seas
deserve special solicitude; these cases stand for the proposition
that only those that make their living at sea do. 509 Therefore,
it follows that the beneficiaries of seamen are intended to receive, at least uniform, if not greater recovery, than the beneficiaries of non-seamen. 510 The "humane and liberal character"
of admiralty law notwithstanding, it is apparent that that is
not the present state of the law in the Ninth Circuit. 511

504. See The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. at 910; but cf. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F.Cas.
480, 482 (C.C.D. Me. 1823).
505. See Walker, 861 F.Supp. at 537 n.14.
506. 298 U.S. 124 (1936) (noting that because of the greater risks borne by
seamen, their rights to recovery have traditionally been broader than those recognized in land-based tort law); but cf. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17.
507. 298 U.S. 110 (1936) (noting that because of the greater risks borne by
seamen, their rights to recovery have traditionally been broader than those recognized in land-based tort law); but cf. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17.
508. Beadle v. Spencer, 298 U.S. 124, 129-30 (1936); The Arizona, 298 U.S. 110,
119-24 (1936). But see Miles, 498 U.S. at 33-37 (loss of society not allowed to
seaman's mother); Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914·17 (loss of society extended to nondependent parents of non-seamen). See supra notes 5, 47·48 and accompanying
text for a discussion of special solicitude toward seamen.
509. See Beadle, 298 U.S. at 129-30; The Arizona, 298 U.S. at 119-24; see also
Harden, 11 F.Cas. at 482; Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 394
n.11. (1970). Although Moragne stands for the proposition that a wrongful death
cause of action exists under the general maritime law, it is at least noteworthy
that, in that case, the Court's humanitarian policy was extended to the beneficiary
of a "Sieracki seaman." ld.; see also, e.g., Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S.
573, 585-90 (1974) (holding that the spouse of a "Sieracki seaman" killed in territorial waters could recover loss of society damages). See supra note 44. Although
the Supreme Court in Higginbotham declined to award loss of society damages to
the beneficiaries of a "longshoreman" based on the "preclusive effects" of DOHSA,
it should be noted that, by the time of that case, the Sieracki seaman doctrine
had been abolished. Mobil Oil v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625-26 (1978).
510. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17 (extending loss of society recovery to nondependent parents of non-seamen); but see Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding, 27 F.3d
426 (9th Cir. 1994) (declining to award loss of society damages to the family members of a seaman); Smith v. Trinidad Corp., 992 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1993) (declining to award loss of society damages to the family members of a seaman).
511. See, e.g., Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917; see supra note 1 regarding seamen's
rights.
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Because the Supreme Court in Gaudet used broad language that did not limit loss of society only to longshoremen in
territorial waters, many lower courts have interpreted Gaudet
as extending "special solicitude" beyond seamen, to all who
bring suit in admiralty jurisdiction.512 However, this extension of solicitude to non-seamen is arguably incorrect because,
both Moragne and Gaudet did not deal with "non-seamen," but
more precisely dealt with "longshoremen," who at the time,
courts were extending solicitude to as "Sieracki seamen."513
Thus, it is arguable that Moragne and Gaudet were never
intend to extended special solicitude beyond the realm of seamen, even though lower courts have since taken it upon themselves to do so by relying on these two cases. 514 Moreover, the
extension of solicitude to non-seamen appears to be in derogation of the rationale behind the principle, which favors extended remedies for seamen based on settled public policy.515 If
Congress wishes to abandon this policy it should announce its
intention to do so in a maritime tort reform package. 516 Until
such time however, courts should take better care not to interpret the "special" out of "special solicitude."517
Derogation of the principle of special solicitude has resulted in a reversal of the rules between seamen and non-seamen. 518 In reaction to the interpretation that some courts
have given to Gaudet, two prominent commentators have noted
that, because Gaudet allowed greater recovery than that which
had been previously available under the federal wrongful death

512. See supra notes 44, 510 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
legal treatment of longshoremen and the extension of solicitude to non-seamen.
See, e.g., Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917.
513. See supra note 44 for a discussion on the "Sieracki seaman" doctrine.
514. See Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 537 n.14.
515. See supra notes 5, 47-48, 79-82 and accompanying text for a discussion on
the duel economic and humanitarian policy of special solicitude.
516. See Steven K Carr, Living and Dying in the Post-Miles World: A Review
of Compensatory and Punitive Damages Following Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 68
TuL. L. REV. 595, 624-25 (1994) (noting that in the wake of Miles it is apparent
legislative and maritime tort reform is needed to provide uniformity in awarding
non-pecuniary elements of tort recovery under maritime law). See also MARITIME
LEGISLATION COMM., MARITIME LAw AsS'N OF THE U.S., Uniform Maritime Standards for Award of Punitive Damages (Final Draft Proposal Aug. 6, 1993).
517. See supra notes 1, 5, 44, 47-48, 79-82 and accompanying text regarding
seamen's rights and discussing the principles of uniformity and special solicitude.
518. See Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 537-38.
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statutes, and under most state wrongful death statutes, from
the point of view of a beneficiary, there are advantages if their
decedent's fatal accident occurs on navigable waters rather
than on an interstate highway.519 The Ninth Circuit's decision in Earles II, extending loss of society damages to nondependent parents, was based precisely on this misinterpreted
notion of special solicitude. 520
The issue begs resolution: What policy can possibly justify
the anomalous recovery that would have occurred between the
beneficiaries of seamen and non-seamen had the WHISKEY
RUNNER not hit a buoy, but instead had collided with a fishing boat in the harbor, and some crew members on the fishing
boat were killed? In order to remedy the current anomalies
illustrated by the Ninth Circuit's holding in Earles II, Congress
should revamp the maritime remedial scheme to allow damages commensurate with the common law of torts and make
provisions for flexible treatment of developments therein. 521
In the alternative, the Supreme Court should define the elements of recoverable damages for wrongful death of a nonseaman in territorial waters; after twenty five years of "further
sifting" in the lower courts, the time is ripe. 522

3.

Even if Loss of Society Damages are Allowed to
Beneficiaries of Non-Seamen in General Maritime Law
Wrongful Death Actions, Admiralty Courts Should Engage
in a Factual Analysis of Loss. Before Extending Recovery to
All Beneficiaries With Standing

In Earles II, the Ninth Circuit implicitly denied any distinction between elements of damages the court awarded when
it resolved the loss of society dependency issue by asserting
that parents had standing to recover under DOHSA and the
Jones Act regardless of dependency.523 Although it is true
that the parents had standing to recover damages by analogy

519. GRANT GILMORE AND CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY, § 633, at 370 (2d ed. 1975).
520. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917.
521. See supra note 510.
522. See supra note 10, 133-37 and accompanying text.
523. See Sutton v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903, 915 (9th Cir. 1994).
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to DORSA, that did not necessarily mean that they could recover all eiements of damages absent proof of 10ss.524 The
overwhelming majority of federal courts deciding the issue
under the general maritime law do not allow loss of society to
non-dependents, because such a rule is a rational and efficient
method of fashioning a schedule of beneficiaries for loss of
society.525

524. See SPEISER, supra note 484, § 3:51, at 238-41 (3d ed. 1992) (noting that
generally, before loss of society damages can be awarded, proof of loss must be
established, and that a suitor's relationship is merely one factor to consider). Note
that the Supreme Court in Gaudet cited Speiser as authority for' propositions on
wrongful death law when the Court introduced recovery for loss of society into the
general maritime law, including the weighty proposition that recovery for such loss
was the majority trend in American jurisprudence. See Sea-Land Services v.
Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585-88 (1974).
525. See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., No. 93-7490, 1994 WL
685690, at *3-4 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1994) (holding that federal maritime law does not
allow recovery for loss of society to non-dependent family members); see also Air
Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on December 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804, 828-30 (2d Cir.
1994) (holding that federal maritime law does not allow recovery for loss of society
to non-ciependent family members); Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4
F.3d 1084, 1090-93 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the non-dependent parents of a
non-seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages
under general maritime law), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1060 (1994); Anderson v.
Whittaker Corp., 894 F.2d 804, 811-12 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the non-dependent parents of non-seamen killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of
society damages under general maritime law); Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 989
(5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the non-dependent parent of a seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime
law), affd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990); Sistrunk v.
Circle Bar Drilling Co., 770 F.2d 455, 458-60 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 775
F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986); Fajardo v. Maersk
Line Agency, 1989 A.M.C. 1923, 1924-28 (D. Md. 1988) (not otherwise reported);
Truehart v. Blandon, 672 F. Supp. 929, 936-38 (E.D. La. 1987); Glad v. American
President Lines, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 183, 184-86 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Lipworth v.
Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A., 592 So. 2d 1151, 1154-55 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1992)
(holding the non-dependent parents of non-seamen killed in territorial waters could
not recover loss of society damages under general maritime law); Perlman v.
Valdes, 575 So. 2d 216, 216-17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the nondependent parents of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover
loss of society damages under general maritime law); but see Earles II, 26 F.3d at
914-917 (holding that loss of society damages could be awarded to the parents of
non-seamen killed in territorial waters regardless of dependency). Cf Evich v.
Connelly, 759 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that because siblings are not
spouses, children, or parents they must, like under DOHSA, prove dependency to
recover damages for maritime wrongful death). See generally Cantore v. Blue Lagoon Water Sports, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1151, 1152-55 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that
the parents of non-seamen killed in territorial waters may recover loss of society
damages under general maritime law only if they are financially dependent on the
decedent).
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Whether a dependency rule is fair, however, is arguable,
because it is conceivable a non-dependent beneficiary might
suffer a genuine loss from being denied their decedent's continued existence. 526 In Rollins v. Peterson Builders, Inc. for example, the record denotes an association between the decedent
and her beneficiary that evidenced loss of society, yet the beneficiary was non-dependent. 527 Thus, if loss of society damage
awards are to remain at the discretion of trial courts, and if
the majority of courts applying federal maritime law apply a
dependency rule, whether the beneficiary is a financial dependent of the decedent should at least be a factor. 528
If loss of society damages remain recoverable under the
general maritime law, a fair solution to awarding them is that
it be reversible error for a trial judge to award loss of society
damages without first considering factors tending to establish
the right to recover. 529 This approach with regard to proof of
loss is in accord with the majority of state jurisdictions and
federal court actions where loss of society type damages are
allowed. 530 Patton-Tully and Neal are two Fifth Circuit admiralty cases where this type of fact analysis was employed. 531
The Second and Sixth Circuits' decisions in Zicherman and
Anderson have also taken this approach.532 Moreover, in
Bergen, even the Ninth Circuit itself scrutinized dependency
when deciding whether to award wrongful death recovery
while sitting in admiralty.533
Among factors the district courts should consider when
deciding whether to award loss of society in maritime cases,
dependency should be paramount, giving deference to the great

526. See Zicherman, 1994 WL 685690, at *3 (noting that "[nlo doubt [a dependencyl rule denies recovery to some deserving parties; nondependent survivors may
feel the loss of a loved one as keenly as dependent survivors."); Rollins v. Peterson
Builders, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 918, 921-24 <n.R.I. 1990).
527. Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 920·24.
528. See SPEISER, supra note 484, § 3:51, at 238-41.
529. See id.
530. SPEISER, supra note 484, § 3:51, at 238-41.
531. Patton-Tully Transp. Co. v. Ratliff, 797 F.2d 206, 208-213 (5th Cir. 1986);
Neal v. Barisich, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 862, 872-73 (E.D. La. 1989), affd, 889 F.2d
273 (5th Cir. 1989).
532. Zicherman, 1994 WL 685690, at *3·4; Anderson, 894 F.2d at 811-12.
533. See supra note 300 and discussing Bergen.
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weight of authority in the non-seamen context which consider
dependency the critical factor. 534 Other factors admiralty
courts should consider were suggested by Neal (common residency, habit of the deceased to tender comfort) and Rollins
(common residency, harmonious family relations, participation
of deceased in family activities).535 Moreover, the proposed
solution is in accord with the Fifth Circuit's recent pronouncement in Randall, and the Second Circuit's recent dicta in
Zicherman, that awards for loss of society damages should not
solely be based on dependency because deserved parties could
necessarily be excluded. 536 Under the proposed solution, such
deserved parties could recover because no one factor would be
determinative. 537
5,34. See supra note 137.
535. See SPEISER, supra note 484, § 3:51, at 241. Speiser's factors, priority
ranked from senior to junior, are as follows:
(1) Familial Relationship;
(2) Financial Dependency;*
(3) Continuous Residency;
(4) Harmonious Relations;
(5) Common Interests;
(6) Participation in Family Activities;
(7) Habit to Tender Solace;
(8) Value of Advice.
See id.; *dependency is inserted at the rank at which it might be considered.
536. Zicherman, 1994 WL 685690, at *3 (noting that "[n)o doubt [a dependency)
rule denies recovery to some deserving parties; non-dependent survivors may feel
the loss of a loved one as keenly as dependent survivors."); Randall v. Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888, 903 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that, "[i)n our view, the law
of this circuit does not unequivocally limit recovery of loss of society damages for
the wrongful death of a parent to children who are financially dependent on the
decedent."); see also Complaint of Nobles, 842 F. Supp. 1430, 1434 n.8 (N.D. Fla.
1993) (noting that, "[t)his court finds that the reasoning that ties recovery for loss
of society to financial dependency strained, and, therefore, will not adhere to the
conclusion reached [that dependency is determinative)); Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki
Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1092 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that, "an essentially
pecuniary standard such as dependency should not provide the dividing line . . .
given the [non-pecuniary) nature of loss of society damages"), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1060 (1994); Choat v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 1994 A.M.C. 2626, 2640 (Ala.
1994) (declining loss of society damages regardless of dependency). But cf. Walker
v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. La. 1994) (recognizing that by concluding loss of
society damages are not allowed in a general maritime wrongful death action,
"implies that the dependency requirement for recovering loss of society damages
under general maritime law is no longer viable"), remand before decision, 995 F.2d
77 (5th Cir. 1993); Earles 11, 26 F.3d at 914-17 (awarding loss of society damages
regardless of dependency).
537. See SPEISER, supra note 484, § 3:51, at 238-41. Although Earles 11 could
appear to comport with the proposed solution (because therein the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the parents' awards for loss of society regardless of dependency), it
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In Gaudet, the Supreme Court noted that loss of society
was measurable by trial courts and that, if not, appellate
courts had the ability to control excessive awards. 538 The
Court therefore granted the district courts discretion to award
loss of society damages pursuant to their constitutional grant
of admiralty jurisdiction and consistent with that grant's implicit mandate on uniformity.639 In Higginbotham, the Court
counseled the district courts not to unduly effect uniformity by
awarding substantial damages for loss of society in non-seamen cases.540 Therefore, when, as in Earles II, a district court
declines to analyze proof of loss, and then awards substantial
recovery for loss of society to the beneficiaries of non-seamen,
its judgment should be vacated. 541 Moreover, when an appeals court, as the Ninth Circuit, affirms such an award based
on an anomaly in admiralty uniformity, the decision should be
reversed. 542 Doing so would ensure that admiralty courts equitably award loss of society damages, and further the aim of
uniformity by precluding appellate courts from creating anomalous rules. 643

should be obvious that, under the proposed solution, the awards would warrant
further consideration because the district court failed to consider any factors when
awarding recovery. See supra note 535 listing factors that admiralty courts might
consider in determining whether a beneficiary could recover for loss of society.
538. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 590.
539. [d.
540. Mobil Oil v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 624-25 n.20 (1978).
541. See Steven K. Carr, Living and Dying in the Post-Miles World: A Review
of Compensatory and Punitive Damages Following Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 68
TUL. L. REV. 595, 624-25 (1994) (hypothesizing that appellate review would possibly remedy the anomalies caused by the few district and state court decision
which strayed from the majority's broad interpretation of the uniformity component
in Miles).
542. See Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 624-25 n.20 (1978).
543. See, e.g., Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17; Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 527, 535
(noting that the Ninth Circuit's holding in Earles II creates non-uniformity between circuits, non-uniformity within the Ninth Circuit, and is non-uniform with
basic admiralty law tenets). It should be noted the proposed solution assumes los8
of society is still allowable in the post-Miles era. See id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of uniformity has been a dominant theme in
the general maritime law since the Supreme Court first explained its special significance to American maritime jurisprudence over a century ago. 644 Another well-settled matter in
general maritime law is that the humane character of proceedings in admiralty provide "special solicitude" to seamen. 545 In
Earles II, the Ninth Circuit decided that loss of society damages could be liberally extended to the non-dependent parents of
non-seamen in a general maritime wrongful death action
("Moragne action")M8 without conflicting with the spirit of the
uniform recovery rule that the Supreme Court applied to seamen in Miles v. Apex Marine. 547
The Earles II holding is alarming because it is an example
of the very anomaly in maritime wrongful death recovery that
the Supreme Court sought to remedy by creating an action for
wrongful death. in admiralty jurisdiction; that is that seamen,
the "wards of admiralty," are provided less protection than
non-seamen. 548 Since the Ninth Circuit de-emphasized the
principle of uniformity, the ultimate question now faced by
practitioners, as well as District Courts sitting in admiralty
within the Ninth Circuit, is whether the failure on the part of
Congress to keep wrongful death damages consistent with

544. See supra notes 14, 49-55 and accompanying text for a discussion on uniformity.
545. Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 587-88 (1974) (holding that
loss of society was incorporated into general maritime law, "to comport with the
humanitarian policy of the maritime law to show 'special solicitude' for those who
are injured within its jurisdiction."); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S.
375, 386-88 (1970) (holding that a cause of action for wrongful death exists under
general maritime law, because the common law rule denying a remedy for wrongful death is unjust and incompatible with maritime equitable principles); The Sea
Gull, 21 F. Cas 909, 910 (C.C.D. Md. 1865) (the leading case advocating that, "it
better becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to
give [rather] than to withhold [al remedy, when not required to withhold it by
established and inflexible rules."). See supra notes 5, 47-48 and accompanying text
for a discussion on special solicitude.
546. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 409 (creating a court-made wrongful death action
in the general maritime law).
547. Sutton v. Earles, ("Earles II") 26 F.3d 903, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1994); see also
Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 33 (1990).
548. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 395; Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916-17; see supra note 1.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995

83

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 6

116

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:33

"special solicitude for seamen" can be permitted to eviscerate
the need for uniformity, which gives rise to the District Courts'
grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the first place.
If so, the Supreme Court may ultimately be spared the necessity of deciding the issue of whether to award loss of society to
the beneficiaries of non-seamen killed in territorial waters
under general maritime law, because the issue would remain a
policy decision for the lower courts to make on a case-by-case
basis.549 If the Supreme Court continues on the course charted in Higginbotham and Miles, which favors uniformity generally, the Court must announce a rule for awarding damages to
non-seamen's beneficiaries. One thing is certain, when courts
fashion policy to escape the intent of antiquated and inflexible
Congressional enactments, the need for review of those enactments by Congress is in order. 550
With the wind of uniformity blowing from the Supreme
Court, and the tide of recent general maritime case law denying non-dependents recovery for loss of society, the Ninth Circuit misapplied the law of maritime wrongful death damages
by departing from the dependency requirement used in other
circuits. 551 In severing the federal interest in uniformity from
the principle of liberal extension of remedies under the general
549. See Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 590 (granting lower courts the discretion to calculate and award loss of society damages); Moragne, 398 U.S. at 408 (declining to
fashion a general maritime wrongful death schedule of beneficiaries and elements
of damages identical to DORSA, thereby leaving open the issues of what damages
could be recovered, and by whom, in a Moragne action).
550. See Steven K. Carr, Living and Dying in the Post-Miles World: A Review
of Compensatory and Punitive Damages Following Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 68
TuL. L. REV. 595, 607-608 (1994) (noting that since Miles, the majority trend is to
decline awards for loss of society in maritime wrongful death actions). Significantly, Carr pointed out that at the time his paper was published, January, 1994, only
a few district courts and state courts had strayed from the majority's broad interpretation of the uniformity component of Miles. [d. Carr thus hypothesized that
appellate review would possibly remedy the anomalies caused by Miles. [d. The
Ninth Circuit has since chosen to aggravate the cleavage, between seamen's recovery and non-seamen's recovery, that Miles causes when its uniform recovery rule
is not applied in general maritime wrongful death cases involving non-seamen.
551. See Cantore v. Blue Lagoon Water Sports, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1151, 1152-55
(S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that maritime wrongful death plaintiffs may recover loss
of society damages for the death of non-seamen in territorial waters only if they
are financial dependents of the decedent). See also supra notes 10, 137 and accompanying text for a discussion on the financial dependency requirement used by the
majority of federal circuits vvhen awarding loss of society damages under the general maritime law.
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maritime law, the Ninth Circuit adopted a rule that is in conflict with both jurisdictional uniformity and "special solicitude"
as it applies to seamen.
Does limiting Miles' uniform recovery rule to seamen's
cases, and then abandoning the "twin aims of admiralty" analysis to extend loss of society to the non-dependent beneficiaries
of non-seamen provide uniformity to maritime law and solace
to the families of seamen? Not with that wind blowing, and
this tide. 662 Since the Supreme Court decided Moragne, twenty five years of "further sifting" through the lower courts has
led to uncertainty for maritime practitioners, anomalous recovery for maritime tort victims, and the current split in the circuits on the dependency issue. In order to prevent further
injustice the Court should, heeding its own call for uniformity,
announce a policy for awarding wrongful death damages to the
beneficiaries of non-seamen killed in territorial waters.

Arthur F. Mead, Ill"

552. See KIPLING, supra note 1, at 216.
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